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: Crashworthiness Enhanced Injury Doctrine

FLORIDA'S MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHWORTHINESS ENHANCED
INJURY DOCTRINE: "WANTED DEAD OR..."
Larry M Roth *
INTRODUCTION

Much has been written over the last decade about the crashworthiness rule, or
second collision theory,' principally in motor vehicle crashes. Although the Florida
Supreme Court recognized the application of the crashworthiness doctrine in
automobile products liability cases in its 1976 ruling in Ford Motor Co. v.
Evancho,2 the scrutiny acutely turned to this legal concept as a result of the 2001
Florida Supreme Court decision in D'Amario v. FordMotor Co. 3
The Court's ruling in D'Amario took a quantum judicial leap from Evancho.
The Florida Supreme Court held in D'Amario that for an enhanced injury or second
collision theory, factual circumstances leading to the first injury, crash, or impact
could not be placed into evidence, for the purposes of diminishment or
apportionment of damages by comparative fault, to the benefit of the
manufacturer.4 The D'Amario decision effectively eliminated from determination
the pro rata responsibility for injury damages under the Supreme Court's earlier
ruling in Fabre v. Marin.5 Accordingly, under D'Amario, although the Court also
held that a manufacturer could not be liable for any injuries or damages caused by
the first collision tortfeasor or the first crash cause in a single vehicle crash,6 it was
only the injuries received by the plaintiff over and above those caused by that first
collision, or first impact, for which a motor vehicle manufacturer was liable for and
were caused by the crashworthiness defect. 7 That is, the enhanced injuries would
not have occurred butfor the lack of crashworthiness defect. The Florida Supreme
Court adopted what was then, and still is today, a minority position taken by courts
across the country.8
B.S. 1973 University of Tennessee, J.D. 1975 University of Florida. Mr. Roth is a trial lawyer with
*
Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A. in their Orlando Office.
See Charles T. Wells et al., D'Amario v. Ford Time to Expressly State the Decision Is No Longer
I.
Viable, 85 FLA BJ. 10 (2011); Theodore J. Leopold et al., The Importance of D'Amario v. Ford and How It
Protects Florida'sConsumers, 85 FLA. B.J. 18 (2011); Larry M. Roth, The Burden of Proof Conundrum In Motor
Vehicles Crashworthiness Cases, 80 FLA. B.J. 10 (2006) [hereinafter Roth, The Burden of Proof Conundrum];
Larry M. Roth, The FloridaSupreme CourtNeeds a Second Look at Second Collisions in Motor Vehicle Cases, 78
FLA. B.J. 20 (2004) [hereinafter Roth, Second Collisions].
327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
2.
3.
806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
4.
Id. at 439.
5.
623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 439-44.
6.
Id.
7.
8.
Id. at 441-42.
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All this will be further discussed below, for it also sets the legal table for the
arguments advanced in this article. That is to say, the crashworthiness enhancement
of injury doctrine has become a relic of the past. In the practical day-to-day battles
in the courtroom, evidentiary proof of enhanced injury in product's motor vehicle
crashworthiness cases has been merely relegated to either a medical examiner,
biomechanic, biomedical engineer, or some other injury mechanism expert with
some credentials. These expert witnesses simply testify that but for the alleged
defect (and if necessary, established by another plaintiffs liability expert) the
plaintiff would not have sustained brain injury, post-crash fire burns, paralysis, or
even death. This is an easy burden of proof to establish in the courtroom,
particularly in Florida courts where previously only the Frye doctrine was
recognized although the Daubert standard will soon apply. 9 In these instances, it is
up to the defense attorney to undermine that expert opinion with the defendant's
theory of what happened. These theories usually include severity of the crash, state
of the art as to the alleged component defect, or that the injury would have
occurred in any comparable vehicle and, thus, there was no enhanced or increased
injury due to any alleged lack of crashworthiness in the product.
A dwindling number of minority states use the crashworthiness enhanced
injury doctrine in the same way as Florida.10 This article proposes replacing it with
a new burden or standard of proof-thereby eliminating the "crashworthiness"
doctrine as we have known it for four decades." The doctrine merely becomes part
of a fault concept consistent with Florida legislatively establishing a pure
apportionment of fault even in crashworthiness cases.12 It is no longer a stand-alone
legal fiction. In 2011, the Legislature took a position that directly overruled the
D'Amario decision on apportionment of fault.' 3
The newly proposed fault concept will apply to what now appears to be an
antiquated legal fiction upon which the crashworthiness doctrine was created in the
1960s. It recognizes that the days of the enhancement or increased injury doctrine,
to the exclusion of considering the first collision involvement, is a judicial fossil.
Florida is now a complete apportionment of fault state.14 Every party and nonparty to a motor vehicle crash is responsible for his or her own fault of the overall
harm." Contribution is gone,16 as well asjoint and several liability.' 7
9.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert testimony concerning scientific
analysis must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it
belongs). The 2013 Florida Legislature passed legislation that a modified Daubert standard apply to expert
witnesses. Opinions must be based on (1) sufficient facts, (2) reliable scientific principles and methods, and (3) the
expert witness has applied principles and methods to the facts of the case. H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2013); 40 FLA. BAR NEWS 20 (May 15, 2013) (eff. July 1, 2013). At the state level, the author does not think this
will make much practical difference. Trial judges simply do not like to deal with this issue.
10.
Edward M. Ricci et al., The Minority Gets It Right: The Florida Supreme Court Reinvigorates the
CrashworthinessDoctrinein D'Amario v. Ford, 78 FLA B.J. 14, 28 (2004).
I1.
It appears that the term "crashworthiness" was first used in this country by William Stieglitz referring
to the ability of the human body to withstand impact. See W. James Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof
in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600, n.2 (1977) (citing W. Stieglitz, Note
on Crashworthiness (Institute of Aeronautical Sciences) No. 266 (1950)).
12.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2011).
13.
Wells, supranote 1, at 16.
14.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2011).
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This article will define and address the crashworthiness/enhanced injury
doctrine and how it evolved in Florida. This article will also discuss how the
separate and distinct causes of action for a second collision enhanced or increased
injury claim can and should be handled by the courts in Florida by abolishing this
common law court created doctrine. Additionally, this article will address the
evidentiary treatment of injuries that were allegedly enhanced as a result of a
claimed defect in the motor vehicle, but which did not cause the initial crash, and
only came into play once the crash occurred.
1. The Genealogy of the Crashworthiness Doctrine
The legal concept of a separate cause of action for a motor vehicle
manufacturer's failure to reasonably protect an occupant or passenger from injury
is a relatively recent addition to the full life of the common law. Holmes' "stop,
look and listen" duty for motor vehicle operators at railroad crossings demonstrated
how enigmatic an internal combustion engine was to his First Order legal
principles. t8 In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., New York Court of Appeals
Judge Benjamin Cardozo first enunciated a defect theory for automobile cases as to
their construction. 19 Yet, courts initially rejected the notion that an automobile
manufacturer had a separate duty to design vehicles so that people would not be
*
in*crashes. 20
injured
The common law recognition of a crashworthiness theory ultimately paralleled
federal legislation regulating motor vehicle safety in the mid-1960s with the
creation of a national regulatory safety agency called the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). 2 1 Regulatory standards were first enacted to set
guidelines for passenger protection in motor vehicles when they were involved in

15.
See T & S Enters. Handicap Accessibility, Inc. v. Wink Indus. Maint. & Repair, Inc., 11 So. 3d 411,
412-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 2009).
Id.
16.
See Wells, supranote 1, at 16.
17.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). In that case, Holmes referred to the decedent
18.
driving an automobile truck:
In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train
is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not
often be required to do more than to stop and look. It seems to us that if he relies upon not
hearing the train or any signal, and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk.
Id. at 70 (quoted in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 273 (1992)).

111 N.E. 1050 (NY 1916). For a good historical reference of the development of product liability
19.
theories which generally involved automobiles, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, JOHN W. WADE & VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, TORTS, CASES & MATERIALS 696-722 (8th ed. 1988).

The main case which held that a manufacturer was not liable for a defect which did not cause the
20.
underlying crash, but caused some type of enhanced or increased injury was Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359
F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The case involved Indiana law. Id. This was ultimately
overruled by the Seventh Circuit. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
The National Highway Traffic Safety Act was passed in 1966. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1381-1431 (1966). The
21.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is the regulatory agency designated to oversee motor
vehicle safety.
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crashes.2 2 They were primitive at first. However, these were not design standards
but performance requirements.23 As a matter of national public policy the Federal
government began to regulate motor vehicle safety.24 Within these regulations were
requirements for the interior safety of passenger cars to help minimize the risk of
injury to occupants once a collision occurred.25 These standards expanded as
vehicles became more sophisticated, and began to regulate all occupant position
seatbelts, airbags, roof strength, side door latch containment, vehicle seatbelt
control devices, front windshield retention, and a host of other increasingly
stringent crash protection requirements.2 6
In 1968, Larsen v. General Motors Corp. first articulated this new common
law principle of crashworthiness as a tort, 27 following the federal regulatory
scheme of post-crash safety requirements being implemented-although, neither
the federal legislation nor the safety standards themselves created any private
causes of action. Larsen held:
No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where
the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the
accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by
the so-called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior
part of the automobile, all are foreseeable. Where the injuries or
enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use
reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its products to an
unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence principles should
be applicable.

22.
"[The] term crashworthiness means the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers
against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." The Motor Vehicle Information Cost
Savings Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 1901 (1972).
23.
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) establish certain requirements for motor
vehicles in terms of crash protection. These are found in the 200 and 300 series of the Regulations. The 100 series
generally deals with crash avoidance. For example, FMVSS 208 has specific injury criteria associated with it. The
regulation also now involves airbags. Under this standard, in barrier frontal collision tests, belted front seat
anthropomorphic dummies (ATD) should not have a head injury criteria (HIC) in excess of 1,000 for duration of 3
milliseconds. There are also injury criteria that must be met for both chest and femur loading. Also, for consumer
information purposes the government under the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) tests vehicles at 35mph in
frontal barrier tests. However, these are not required regulations. There is a 1/3 increase of energy in a 5mph
barrier collision differential between 30 mph and 35 mph and thus it is much more severe. The government rates
vehicles in these crash tests at 35 mph under the NCAP program in terms of how they perform on various injury
criteria numbers, such as head injury criteria.
24.
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted by Congress in 1966 to reduce traffic accidents and
deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents. 15 U.S.C. § 1381.
25.
See id.
26.
See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.1-71.4 (2013).
27.
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The Second Restatement was promulgated before the Larsen case came
out in 1968. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965) Also, Evans v. GeneralMotors Corp., which did
not hold the manufacturer potentially liable for a lack of crashworthiness in 1966, was also before the Second
Restatement. See Foland,supra note I1, at 601-43.
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[S]uch manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the
design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.28
Under Larsen, an automobile manufacturer had to foresee that crashes would
occur to their motor vehicles and, consequently, the manufacturer then had a duty
to make its vehicles reasonably safe for the occupants once that first accident or
impact occurred.29
A watershed development to this new common law concept shortly followed in
Huddell v. Levin. 30 This case further expanded the Larsen theorem, and clearly
established that a manufacturer would be liable when the design of the motor
vehicle increased, made greater, or enhanced a passenger's injury in a crash from
what was caused by the first accident of a vehicle to vehicle, vehicle to object or
occupant to some interior component of the vehicle, for example.31 It was just not
that the occupant was injured, but that he or she suffered an increased harm due to
a defect in a vehicle crash protection component after the first accident occurred.
For a jury to make this increased or enhanced injury determination, Huddell
Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502 (emphasis added). It appears that the Larsen decision is now followed
28.
unanimously in American courts. See Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16, Chapter 4, at 242 (1998); see generally Barry Levenstan & Daryl J. Lapp,
Plaintiffs' Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DE
PAUL L. REV. 55 (1988) (analyzing American courts that have adopted the Larsen rule). Consequently, almost all
jurisdictions have since adopted a crashworthiness, defect enhanced injury cause of action. One jurisdiction
initially did not. See McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), affd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th
Cir. 1973). West Virginia was a long holdout to adopting the Crashworthiness Doctrine. Euler v. Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Va. 1992); Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d 781. For a listing of those states that
have recognized the enhanced injury or crashworthiness doctrine, see Kerry A. Shad, Warren v. Colombo: North
CarolinaRecognizes Claimfor EnhancedInjury, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1330, 1342 n.3 (1990).
The theory of crashworthiness is based upon a duty, or imposition of potential liability against a motor
29.
vehicle manufacturer because car accidents are foreseeable. What is a reasonably foreseeable occurrence is, of
course, a less than certain matter. Nevertheless, the rationale for imposing liability against an automobile
manufacturer for the second collision is due to the fact that they must take into account that automobile accidents
will occur. See 22 AM. LAW. PROD. LIAB. 3D § 95:8, at 19; see also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976)
(describing the crashworthiness law of New Jersey); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Kern v. General Motors Corp., 724 P.2d 1365 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 336 A.2d 118 (Md. 1975).
The Larsen court also stated the following:
Accepting, therefore, the principle that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction
extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden
defects that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper
interpretation of 'intended use'. Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in
transporting persons and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be
carried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved hazard of injuryproducing impacts of various types. The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does
not intend its product to be involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it
knows that the probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some
type of injury-producing accident.
Larsen, 391 F.2d at 501-02.
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
30.
"Most jurisdictions have adopted" the position of allowing or holding a manufacturer potentially liable
31.
for a defect design which "produces injuries but not the accident in which the injuries were sustained." 22 AM.
LAW. PROD. LIAB. 3D, supra note 29, at 18.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013

5

Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

394

Barry Law Review

Vol. 18, No. 2

established an evidentiary burden of proof standard for plaintiffs to meet.32 Other
similar court decisions, such as the so-called Fox-Mitchell line of cases, coming on
the heels of Huddell, nevertheless differed on the burden of proof issue and
evidentiary analysis. There followed, which continues still today, a fierce debate
over how a litigant proves an enhanced or increased injury case, who has the initial
burden, and what happens if the first injury cannot be separated from the second or
so-called enhanced injury.34
Of course, this new cause of action, now regularly known as crashworthiness
law, at least in form did not create any absolute liability. The Larsen Court held
that a manufacturer is not an insurer and therefore, does not have to make an
injury-proof vehicle.35 In reality, however, to the manufacturer these judicial
platitudes were meaningless words offered in a vacuum of legal niceties. This socalled protection for the manufacturer certainly did not chill the filing of lawsuits.36
Each car crash, in turn, where there were serious injuries and no insurance to go
after from the original tortfeasor, then became a potential motor vehicle
crashworthiness cause of action.37
Florida arrived late to this crashworthiness party. After the Florida Supreme
Court's 1976 adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts strict
liability cause of action in West v. CaterpillarTractorCo.," it was only a matter of
time before crashworthiness issues would be raised as a new common law cause of
action. In Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, the Florida Supreme Court enunciated a
negligence cause of action that created liability for a motor vehicle's lack of
crashworthiness. 39 The Evancho decision did little original analysis, in essence
only quoting at length from the earlier Larsen decision.
32.
This is addressed in more detail later in this article. However, the issue of who has the burden of proof
in establishing that the alleged defective product "enhanced the injuries sustained in an accident" has resulted in a
jurisdictional split. Id. There are various nuances to a general rule that either the plaintiff is or is not required to
prove what would have been the enhanced injuries had an alternative, safer design been used. Id Some states
require only that the plaintiff show that the alleged defect was a "substantial factor" in causing the alleged
enhanced injury. See generally id at 20.
33.
Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787-788 (10th Cir. 1978); Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG,
669 F.2d 1199, 1204-06 (8th Cir. 1982).
34.
See generally Heather Fox Vickles & Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal
Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 417, 440-4 (1995); Foland, supra note I1, at 612-19.
35.
Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503. The Larsen court stated as follows:
We do agree that under the present state of the art an automobile manufacturer is under no
duty to design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats on water, but
such manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.
Id. at 502.
36.
For review of what had been labeled as the products liability "crisis," see DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E.
MONTGOMERY & W. PAGE KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY (3d ed. 1996); see Wells, supra note 1, at

14.
37.
The number of car crashes each year, and resulting fatalities and injuries, are staggering. Based upon
field accident data in NHTSA databases, there are in excess of 7.6 million car crashes, approximately 35,000
which are fatal, involving 11.7 million occupants, with injuries of 2.6 million, and seriously injured occupants at
105,000 plus. See DAVID C. VIANO, ROLE OF THE SEAT IN REAR CRASH SAFETY 7 (S.A.E. 2002).

38.
39.

336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201, 204 (Fla. 1976) (seatback claim).
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In so holding, however, the Larsen court recognized that
manufacturers are not insurers and are under no duty to design a
crashworthy, accident-proof, or foolproof vehicle. We adopt the
Larsen view, holding that the manufacturer must use reasonable
care in design and manufacture of its product to eliminate
unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.40
Yet, the Florida Supreme Court neither addressed the already existing Huddell,
or opposing Fox-Mitchell analysis on evidentiary burdens of proof for proving an
enhanced injury from a causation standpoint. The court noted only the black letter
law principle for a crashworthiness theory of action under Florida's judicial
system. The next step came in Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.,41 when
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal extended Evancho to include
motorcycles. Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court extended a strict liability
application to crashworthiness cases in its FordMotor Co. v. Hill opinion.42
All of these Florida based pronouncements were only theoretical and esoteric.
From a comparative fault standpoint they did not deal with the reality of
establishing guidelines or principles of how a lawyer was to try a crashworthiness
case. Nor did they deal with how judges or juries were to figure out what an
enhanced injury was, the causation of it, and what to do about the underlying first
accident and the so-called first injury, if any.43
In Florida products liability "crashworthiness" trials, the Evancho and Hill
decisions were always cited, usually by both sides, but there was a practical
evidentiary gap between their applications." Plaintiffs would argue in
crashworthiness cases that the evidentiary and proof analysis should only begin

Id.
40.
Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 370 So. 2d 68, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1979) (motorcycle
41.
crashworthiness). The concept of crashworthiness liability for a product manufacturer has also been extended
beyond that of motor vehicles. They have included things from airplanes to riding lawnmowers. In Florida, the
concept was applied to a motor boat situation. See Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487 So. 2d 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st
1986) (pleasure boat); see generally McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (App. 1983) (airplane);
Tafoya v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1989) (riding lawnmower); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp.,
478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991) (grain harvester); Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988) (snow plow); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978) (snowmobile); Roe v. Deere & Co.,
855 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1988) (agricultural tractor); Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 418 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Okla.
1975) (airplanes).
42.
404 So. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. 1981) (applying strict liability theory to crashworthiness claim). In
Florida, the Standard Jury Instructions do not specify whether a strict liability instruction should be used for the
consumer expectation test, or the risk-benefits analysis. However, in Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298
(Cal. 1994), the court held that the risk-benefit analysis should be used in a situation involving crashworthiness
where the expectation is beyond the everyday experience of a user.
43.
Courts routinely use the interchangeability of the terms crashworthiness, injury enhancement and
second collision. See generally Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981); Bolm v.
Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769, 772 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1973); Seese v. Volkswagenwert, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 838
n.7 (3d Cir. 1981); Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981). "Courts should abandon the
'second collision' jargon. Enhanced injury theory should be the product of thoughtful legal analysis and not the
overloading of other legal liability concepts." Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic
Framework,62 N.C. L. REV. 643, 650-51 (1984).
Roth, Second Collisions,supranote 1, at 22.
44.
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once the motor vehicle crash had occurred, 4 5 and anything to do with why the crash
happened in the first instance was irrelevant. Thus, arguendo,what transpired up to
that point of the first collision by the tortfeasor driver would be without relevance
to any enhanced injuries, and otherwise prejudicial.46 Unfortunately, the reality of
life in courtroom trials was that many of these lawsuits arose from drunk driving
incidents where the crashworthiness litigation was likely generated by the absence
of any, or adequate, insurance covering the Driving While Intoxicated (DWI)
tortfeasor, which were likely exceptions to coverage in many situations, except for
47
the practicality of minimum coverages.
On the other hand, attorneys for the vehicle manufacturers argued that the
circumstances of the underlying crash, whether a single or multiple vehicles, could
not be excluded from the jury's decision-making process.48 The defense argued that
the nature and circumstances surrounding the first crash were what caused the
injuries. That is, the initial crash or first -accident caused the injuries-they were
not enhanced. If comparative fault, even in strict liability cases, was to be applied,
as West held, then what fault occurred in the so-called first collision was essential
in evaluating how and why any injury occurred-enhanced or not. 49
These conflicting positions highlighted the critical underpinning of any
crashworthiness cause of action-the injury. Defendants argued that circumstances
and consequences of the first collision had to be considered in order to determine
whether the injury claim was enhanced or increased, and whether without the
initial collision there could not be a second collision.50 As an example, in a high
speed multiple vehicle crash that resulted in a post-crash fuel fed fire (i.e., the gas
tank exploded), whether a plaintiff was killed from the thermal mechanism from
the fire, or whether the occupant was already dead from the severity of the crash
itself before the fire began.'
Fabre v. Martin further complicated the matter.52 Although not a products
liability crashworthiness case, the Florida Supreme Court held in Fabre that all
parties, even those not sued but potentially at fault, or those who had already
settled, could be on a verdict form so that everyone's pro rata percentage of fault
and responsibility would be determined by the jury.13 After the Fabre decision
45.
Id.
46.
For review of the crashworthiness doctrine as it was earlier applied in Florida by the plaintiffs'
attorneys, see Edward Ricci & Theresa DiPaola, Evolution of the Automobile Crashworthiness Doctrine in
Florida,69 FLA. B.J. 40 (1995).
47.
See, e.g., Roth, Second Collision, supranote 1, at 22.
48.
Id.
49.
As noted, Florida had adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 402A; West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
50.
For a good elementary explanation and illustrations of second collision principles, see N.J. Wittner,
CrashworthinessLitigation:Principlesand Proofs, S.A.E. Paper No. 900371, printed in Accident Reconstruction
S.A.E. Sp.- 8 14, at 199-211 (1990), http://trid.trb.org/results.aspx?q=&cdatein=1year&datein=1year&sortbypublisheddate&sortdir-desc#. See also Litigation ofthe Complex Motor Vehicle CrashworthinessCase (Practicing
Law Inst. No. 383, 1989).
51.
Note: This can be partially determined by the amount of carbon dioxide (C02) in the lungs as
demonstrated on autopsy.
52.
623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
53.
Id. at 1187.
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defendant manufacturers were more successful in arguing that the events and
parties responsible for the first crash had to be included for a jury determination of
fault and, if the evidence supported it, ultimately placed on the verdict form. This
in turn required all the circumstances of the motor vehicle crash event, even the socalled first collision, to be litigated in a crashworthiness case. Fabre and its
progeny's analysis, arguendo, seemed well suited to second collision litigation.5 4
After all, the enhanced injury concept was nothing more than apportioning out the
first injury from that of the so-called increased injury harm. That is, the injury
which would have been anyway, and the alleged enhanced injury which occurred
afterwards. Thus, from the defense standpoint, all tortfeasors, including drunk
drivers, had to be on the verdict form for the jury to apportion fault as Fabre
required if supported by the evidence, and if the tortfeasors or others could be
identified.
There was little to no guidance for some time from the Florida appellate courts
to help resolve how this crashworthiness evidentiary and trial procedural quandary
was to be resolved, which became initially tied up through motions in limine before
a trial judge. The Fabre decision gave defendants' attorneys an upper hand in
litigation. Defense attorneys could then argue that all the circumstances
surrounding or involving a motor vehicle crash, including even a drunk driver,
must be litigated so the jury could sort out what happened, and whether any second
collision defect in the safety protection of the vehicle in fact enhanced, or made the
ultimate injury worse, such as catastrophic versus non-catastrophic injury. 6 Of
course, which party should have the burden of persuasion or proof to establish the
causation of the enhanced injury, if any, continued to be unclear in Florida. Stated
differently, which party had to prove, or disprove, but for or more likely than not
requirement the enhanced injury was due to the alleged post-crash defect.57
Another problem that arose for product liability trial lawyers, and ultimately the
courts, was how to characterize and determine apportionment of fault if there was
only a crashworthiness defect of enhanced injury alleged, and the plaintiff had not
sued or had already settled with the first party tortfeasor.
Only Florida's Third District Court of Appeal in Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona
specifically addressed whether the underlying first accident causing tortfeasor, and
their comparative negligence, should be considered by the jury in a
59
Yet, that court
crashworthiness case. Kidron was decided prior to Fabre.
allowed into evidence the driver/plaintiff's own fault in causing the initial accident

See Nash v. Wells-Fargo Guard Servs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996) (noting it is the defendant's
54.
burden to present evidence of fault of non party before jury can determine percentage of fault of that non party);
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox, 623 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1993) (tortfeasor is required to be on verdict form even though
statutorily immune under Worker's Compensation law).
Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1187.
55.
See Roth, Second Collision, supra note 1, at 24.
56.
The but for analogy is one that is simple and easy to apply. See also Karen L. Chadwick, "Causing"
57.
Enhanced Injuries in Crashworthiness Cases, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223, 1226-27 (1998).
58.
665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1995).
Id.
59.
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to be considered by the jury on a crashworthiness claim.60 The jury, according to
Kidron, could apportion overall fault between the plaintiff, and in that particular
case the trailer manufacturer for its design.6 ' In Kidron, the driver/plaintiff was at
fault for running into the rear of a tractor/trailer that had stopped off the roadway. 62
The crashworthiness claim against the trailer manufacturer was that it did not
design or have in place a bar to prevent vehicle underride if the trailer was rearended by another vehicle (not a tractor trailer).63 There was no analytical discussion
in Kidron about the difference between apportionment of fault (ultimately Fabre),
and apportionment of non-enhanced and enhanced injury (necessary to
crashworthiness). The court in Kidron did not say that the resultant injury or death
had to be assumed, was deemed an indivisible injury, and had to be combined fault
of both for which either one could be held fully liable. 4 If the jury was separating
out fault in Kidron it was only doing so in order to determine causation of the
ultimate injury. There was no issue of alcohol involved in that case.
The only other case to arise pre-D'Amario was Smith v. Fiat-RooseveltMotors,
Inc. in 1977.67 This was also a pre-Fabreappellate case, but this time in the federal
system. Although the primary issue was whether a merchandiser could be held
liable under a warranty theory of crashworthiness, the court reversed a defendant's
summary judgment on the issue of the enhanced injury.6 8 The Smith court stated
that Florida law usually does not allow a defendant to win where an injury is
indivisible and where the plaintiff could not apportion out the differences.69 Smith
was a vehicle seatback case.70 In other words, under Florida's concurrent tortfeasor
law if injuries were not apportionable between the two tortfeasors, then each could
be held separately liable for the entire harm.7 1 The later D'Amario case did not
mention or address the Smith decision.72
2. Florida Takes a Minority Position on Crashworthiness Apportionment
of Fault Analysis
In 2001 the Justices of the Florida Supreme Court took a dive into these murky
waters. Yet, there were perhaps only two members of the Court who, at that time,
had ever tried a motor vehicle products liability case.73 The result was the
consolidated decision in D'Amario v. Ford.74
Id. at 293.
60.
Id at 290.
61.
Id at 291.
62.
See Kidron, 665 So. 2d at 289.
63.
Id at 293.
64.
Id
65.
66.
See id.
556 F.2d 728, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1977).
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 729.
69.
Roth, The Burden of Proof Conundrum,supra note 1, at 11.
70.
Id.
71.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
72.
73.
Justice Charles Wells was formerly both a defense and plaintiffs' trial attorney before going to the
Bench. He had some prior products liability experience. See Barati v. Aero Indus., Inc., 579 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist.
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Briefly the facts: (1) D'Amario involved a Ford automobile driven by a drunk
driver. The plaintiff was a passenger.76 The driver lost control and the vehicle
impacted a tree.77 Some time elapsed after that impact and then a fuel leak caused
the vehicle to catch fire.7 8 The occupant/plaintiff received burn injuries. 7 9 There
was a dispute as to what caused the post-collision fuel fed fire.80 (2) Nash involved
the driver of a General Motors vehicle. 8 ' A drunk driver in another vehicle
impacted Nash's car.82 As a result of that collision Nash's head impacted the Apillar, the post between the forward edge of the door and the edge of the
windshield. Nash was killed by the impact with the pillar.84
Both cases involved crashworthiness allegations that the design of the vehicles
enhanced the injuries. In both cases, the plaintiff's conduct did not contribute to the
cause of the initial collision or any of the enhanced injuries. Plaintiffs actions in
both cases were in no way connected to the alleged defects which created the
enhanced injury, i.e., a faulty fuel system, or a structural A-pillar which should
have been designed differently. Unlike other possible crash scenarios, the Florida
Supreme Court was persuaded under these facts to draw a bright line demarcation
between the injury enhancing defect claim and the underlying circumstances of
why the initial accident occurred in the first place, separating out the injuries
between these two distinct events.87
The Florida Supreme Court rendered several holdings in these consolidated
cases.88 First, they determined the plaintiff would have the burden of proof in
establishing what the enhancement was over and above the injury caused by the
first accident.8 9 Although the level of evidentiary proof was not articulated or
analyzed, the court resolved an otherwise unresolved issue in favor of the
defense.9 0 There had been no previous Florida cases providing guidance on this
Ct. App. 5th 1991). Justice Fred Lewis, voting with the D'Amario/Nash majority, also had trial lawyer experience
in products liability cases. See Moorman v. Am. Safety Equip., 594 So. 2d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1992);
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz, 507 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1987). A Westlaw search for cases wherein
any of the D Amario/Nash court Justices were counsel of record disclosed no other product liability citations
attributed to other members of the Court.
D'Amario v. Ford, 806 So. 2d 424, 428 (Fla. 2001).
74.
Roth, Second Collisions, supra note 1,at 22.
75.
Id.
76.
Id
77.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d 424,428 (Fla. 2001).
78.
Id
79.
Id.
80.
Nash v. Gen. Motors Corp., 734 So. 2d 427, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1999).
81.
Id.
82.
83.
Id at 439.
84.
Id
D Amario, 806 So. 2d at 427; Nash, 734 So. 2d at 438-39.
85.
D Amario, 806 So. 2d at 428; Nash, 734 So. 2d at 439.
86.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 439-40.
87.
Although not important to this article, D'Amario/Nash had also determined that a drunk or intoxicated
88.
driver was considered an intentional tortfeasor. Nash, 734 So. 2d at 440. As such, that person could not be
included on the verdict form as a party or non-party for apportionment of fault under Stellas. Id. The Florida
Supreme Court reversed the DCA in Nash on this issue. D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 437.
89.
D Amario, 806 So. 2d at 439.
Id. at 440-41; see generally Vickles & Oldham, supranote 34, at 426 n.58.
90.
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evidentiary point. Now the burden of proof to establish the enhanced or increased
injury was imposed on the plaintiff.9'
Second, the court held that in crashworthiness cases the Fabre principles of
comparative apportionment of fault did not apply. 92 It was even reversible error,
therefore, to have had the D'Amario/Nash juries consider the causative fault of a
third party tortfeasor who caused the underlying accident in these enhanced injury
crashworthiness cases.93 Accordingly, there were to be no jury instructions given
on comparative fault under Fabre, and no party or non-party causing the
underlying or first accident could be placed on the verdict form so that a jury might
reduce the liability of the vehicle manufacturer's crashworthiness liability by
attributing comparative fault to the first tortfeasor. 94 The jury could not consider
comparative fault of the circumstances causing the so-called first collision in
second collision crashworthiness trials. In essence, the trial snapshot of evidence
was to begin at the instant the crash or accident had occurred. This rule is exactly
the rule of law plaintiffs' attorneys, as noted above, had previously long argued to
Florida trial judges in similar cases. The underlying crash circumstances, why it
happened and the conduct of a tortfeasor (i.e., drugs, alcohol), was not to be part of
the evidentiary trial. It no longer mattered for purposes of a crashworthiness theory
why the accident occurred in the first place, nor its secondary circumstances. So if
the crash involved multiple vehicles, the other drivers and the circumstances of the
accident would not come into evidence.9 6
Third, the court held that a manufacturer could only be liable for the enhanced
injury and not for any damages caused by the initial accident.97 The court's
rationale supported its belief to keep out the first accident from evidentiary proof
and liability. The court apparently believed it was placing a limitation on a
manufacturer's risk exposure on the assumption they would only be liable for the
enhanced, or greater made injury, allegedly caused by the crashworthiness defect,
which only came into play once an initial accident occurred. 99
In reaching their decision, the Florida Supreme Court analyzed conflicting
groups of decisions it characterized as the "majority" 00 and "minority" national
viewpoints.' In adopting their policy of excluding circumstances and fault from
the underlying accident for purposes of jury consideration in crashworthiness
91.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 441.
92.
Id. at 434-35.
93.
Id. at 442.
94.
Id at 440-42.
95.
See Roth, supranote 45.
96.
D Amario, 806 So. 2d at 441.
Id
97.
98.
Id at 441-42.
Id.
99.
100.
Id. at 431. The majority of courts around the country have recognized that comparative negligence or
fault is a defense even in a crashworthiness enhanced injury case. See generally Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1996); Hinkamp
v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989), affd, 900 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1990).
101.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 433. The essential minority cases cited were Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 566 (D.S.C. 1999), rev. in part & vac., 269 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 2000) and Reed v. Chrysler Corp.,
494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992).
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cases, the Florida Supreme Court sided with the minority position. 102 D'Amario
substantially relied on a 1982 law review article, which had argued against
apportionment of comparative fault for second collision cases. 103 This law review
article also asserted the impossibility of apportioning 100% of fault between all
parties in crashworthiness cases if the underlying tortfeasor was included.'04
Additionally, to support its decisional rationale D'AmariolNash analogized
these crashworthiness/second collision cases to a medical malpractice situation
which fell under the successive liability doctrine.105 That is, a tortfeasor is not able
to bring into the motor vehicle case, or a defendant use as an affirmative defense,
the medical malpractice by a healthcare provider which occurred subsequent to the
original tort that landed the plaintiff in the hospital in the first place.106 That initial
tortfeasor must bear all the damages consequences due to his or her original
conduct, even if this subsequent medical malpractice made the injury worse, or
caused a death.107 That is, the malpractice enhanced the initial injury from the first
accident, i.e., increased the harm. The Court's rationale here was that medical
malpractice was foreseeable once the tortfeasor created the circumstances for
sending the plaintiff to the hospital in the first place.108 The Court's other analogy,
within a medical malpractice corollary, was a situation where the doctor was not
permitted legally to reduce subsequent malpractice liability by apportioning fault to
the plaintiff, for example, by causing their own injuries in the first place (as if they
were the first accident tortfeasor), or to a pre-existing disease which initially
brought the victim in for medical treatment. 109

102.
DAmario, 806 So. 2d at 435.
103.
See Robert C. Reichert, Limitations on Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision Actions, 43 MONT.
L. REV. 109, 117-20 (1982). In D'Amario, the Court stated as follows:
We agree that to automatically compare the fault of the driver in causing the accident with
the fault of the automobile manufacturer for the subsequent enhanced injury would be, as
Reichert explains, to confuse two different causes-the cause of the accident and the cause
of the enhanced injury.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 437 (citations omitted).
104.
Id. at 434 (citing Reichert, supranote 103).
We must admire the courts for creating new causes of action like second collision liability to
compensate those who are unfortunate enough to be harmed by others. Nevertheless, the
courts must support the desirable goal of encouraging members of our society to be
responsible for their own safety. By limiting manufacturer liability in second collision
actions in a principled and fair manner, and requiring individuals to take affirmative action
to guard against unnecessary injury, the courts will continue to serve the interests of society.
Reichert, supranote 103, at 129.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 437.
105.
Id. at 435.
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 435; see e.g., Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla.
108.
1980); Assoc. for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. v. Fletcher, 741 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 1999).
109.
See Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1981), where the reason causing the
patient to seek medical care resulting in subsequent malpractice treatment was not a legal cause of that medical
negligence. In Whitehead the plaintiff had attempted to commit suicide. Id. at 378. The court held the plaintiffs
own suicidal conduct was too remote to be considered a contributing legal cause of the subsequent medical
malpractice. Id. at 379.
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To the Florida Supreme Court, a crashworthiness second collision or enhanced
injury claim was separate, distinct, and clearly divisible sequentially from the
underlying first crash circumstances. 10 There was a clear demarcation between an
enhanced injury and the injury caused by the first accident, whatever that might
be."' The events and circumstances of an accident situation were totally separate
from the subsequently caused interior component or accident impact design defect
causing an enhanced injury which occurred only after the first collision was
over.112 The Court looked at a bright line separation from first collision to second
collision in a purely temporal sense." 3 Accordingly, that first accident tortfeasor
could not be used to reduce a manufacturer's separate and distinct crashworthiness
enhanced injury liability. That is presumably why the Court felt so comfortable
with its successive tort/medical malpractice analogies. The second injury causation,
enhanced or increased, was a different tort from the first accident cause, and the
former manifested itself only subsequent in time from a sequential demarcation to
the conduct which created the initial crash.
Therefore, a crashworthiness enhanced injury analysis was no different from a
subsequent medical malpractice occurring after the initiation of the original tort.
Although from a time sequence, the later negligence might occur hours or days
after the first tortfeasor caused the accident. This analogy to a successive medical
malpractice event was that the person causing an injury first sending the person to
the hospital set in motion the opportunity for that malpractice, which Florida law
then deemed was foreseeable.1 4 As a reverse corollary, to the vehicle manufacturer
it was also foreseeable that motor vehicle crashes occur and so they would be held
responsible for the consequences flowing therefrom, if a reasonably safe design
was not provided to protect the occupant from the inevitable accident."'
In both D'Amario and Nash, the Court at length highlighted how the
manufacturers' defense trial attorneys used the alcohol "card" to distract and
confuse the juries.1 6 Quotations from the trial records were used extensively to
demonstrate how alcohol intoxication by the first accident tortfeasor was argued
prejudicially to highlight fault in the causation of the underlying crash that really
caused the injuries."' This, the Florida Supreme Court believed, confused the two
juries."' When too much emphasis and demagoguery was exercised to allow undue
pervasive attention be given to alcohol and intoxication, the jury was unable to
focus on the true issue of whether a safety defect provided reasonable safety to the
occupant once an accident occurred, or if the vehicle enhanced or increased the
injury from what would have been from the initial accident, but for the defect.
Accordingly, the majority of Justices decided evidence of what happened to cause
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 435; see also Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703, 707 (Fla. 1977).
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 438.
Id at441
Id.at44(-A1.
Id at440.
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the motor vehicle accident to occur in the first place, i.e., alcohol, had no role in a
second collision defect case, and that this first tortfeasor could not be on the verdict
form under Fabre for comparative fault determination to reduce a manufacturer's
liability.119
There was a dissent in D'Amario.120 Then Chief Justice Wells, joined by one
other Justice, dissented and concurred.121 The concurrence was regarding quashing
the District Court's reversal of the trial court's granting a new trial for plaintiff in
D'Amario.122 Simply put, Justice Wells did not feel the trial judge abused its
discretion by granting a new trial, as the Second District had concluded. That new
trial was ordered because of the prejudice resulting to the plaintiffs case due to
how the alcohol issue was used and came into evidence.1 2 3
The dissenters could not go along, however, with the five justice majority on
the apportionment of fault decision. Chief Justice Wells believed that the
D'Amario/Nash rule would be an unworkable trial procedure proposition.124 Also,
the dissent argued that Florida already had ample protections available to a trial
judge to control evidentiary admissibility, and the use of alcohol references which
pervasively influenced both these particular trials.125 Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Florida Supreme Court, on the record before it, to suddenly adopt
a new legal landscape changing legal pronouncement by mandating how
crashworthiness cases were to be treated differently from all other tort cases,
irrespective of whether this rule was to be enacted from a "majority" or "minority"

perspective.126
Much of the dissent's discussion was focused on the holding in Meekins v.
Ford Co.,' 27 a "majority" position case, which was also extensively cited in the
main D'Amario/Nash opinion, but ultimately rejected.12 8 In Meekins, the Court
discussed several of the same real world problems in crashworthiness cases caused
by excluding evidence of comparative fault caused by the first crash to reduce a
manufacturer's liability.129

Id. at 441-42.
119.
Id at 442.
120.
DAmario, 806 So. 2d at 442.
121.
122.
Id. at 443 (discretion of trial court in granting motion for new trial).
Id. at 442-43.
123.
Id. at 442.
124.
Id. at 443 (citing FLA. STAT. §90.403 (2000)).
125.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 442-43.
126.
Id at 444-45 (quoting Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 345-46 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997)).
127.
Id. at 432-33; see Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 343 n.22 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1997). Meekins v.
128.
Ford cited Professor Reichert's Montana Law Review article as support for the rationale why comparative
negligence should not be used to evaluate ultimate proximate causation in an enhanced injury case. Id. at 342-43.
The D Amario majority relied on the Reichert article extensively. D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 434.
It is, indeed, ironic that both the majority decision in D'Amario and the dissent extensively cited the
129.
Meekins case. Meekins, however, went with the majority of jurisdictions, which have held that comparative
negligence is a proper apportionment of proximate causation in an enhanced injury case. Meekins, 699 A.2d at
344. In Meekins, the issue came up as a result of plaintiffs filing "a motion in limine to exclude the trial testimony
of an accident reconstruction expert hired by the defendant who will offer testimony regarding plaintiffs
negligence in causing the accident and the dynamics of the resulting injury which plaintiff claims to have
sustained." Id. at 340. The claimed defect in Meekins was an airbag, which allegedly injured the plaintiffs fingers
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Chief Justice Wells' comments provided a practical platform to be used as a
reason for supporting the ultimate conclusion of this article. Although the Wells
dissent far from advocated abolishing the crashworthiness doctrine altogether, it
did argue for a practical solution to these crashworthiness discrepancies.13 0
According to the dissent, let the trial courts instead use the tools they have
available to control evidentiary admissibility."' Such a rule will allow the
formidable adversarial talents of plaintiffs' attorneys litigating product liability
cases establish the proper evidentiary balance for each case under its particular
facts. Therefore, if all the facts come in, the jury should be able to assess liability
against all parties involved.
3.

The Litigation World in Florida After D'Amario and Nash

The Florida Supreme Court has never expounded upon its decision of how to
implement D'Amario. Those first few cases coming up through the intermediate
appellate courts were perfunctorily reversed and remanded for new trials because
of the D'Amario/Nash decision.132 There were, however, some other immediate
impacts resulting from D'Amario and Nash. On the practical side, for example,
General Motors (GM) had a jury verdict increased by the Fourth District from $33
million to $60 million. In GeneralMotors Corp. v. McGee the jury had apportioned
fault against a drunk tortfeasor causing the initial crash so GM received a 45%
verdict reduction." The First District's Griffin v. Kia decision was an appellate
court decision that substantively dealt with the D'Amario/Nashdecision.' 34
Griffin arguably demonstrated many of the weaknesses in the D'Amario
analysis. Griffin brought a claim alleging he was rendered a quadriplegic because
of a defect in the reclining front seatback of his Kia, a compact passenger car. 131
The claim was that if a passenger was fully reclined in the front seatback and
wearing the seatbelt, the reclining of the seatback compromised the effectiveness of
on his left hand as a result of the deployment of the airbag. Id. The defect in the airbag resulted in the fingers being
"crushed against the steering wheel when the airbag inflated." Id
130.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 442-43.
131.
Id.
132.
See Ferayomi v. Hyundai Motor Co., 822 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2002); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v.
McGee, 837 So. 2d 1010, 1030, 1039-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In Hyundai Motor Co. v. Ferayorni,the court
had initially reversed the trial court for refusing to add a drunk driver, as a non-party defendant under Fabre, on
the verdict form. 842 So. 2d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2003). That decision had specifically disapproved of Nash
v. General Motors Corp., which held that a drunk driver would be an intentional tortfeasor and therefore under
Fabre would not be a comparative fault party for purposes of apportionment. 734 So. 2d at 440. D'Amario
overruled Nash on that issue finding that a drunk driver resulting in an accident was not an intentional tort. See
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 438. The Florida Supreme Court, based upon D'Amario, later remanded Ferayornifor
consideration in light of its decision in D'Amario. Ferayorni, 822 So. 2d 502. Although the initial judgment in
Ferayorni did not reduce the verdict amount by the comparative fault of a third party or non-party Fabre
defendant, the case was remanded back to the Fourth District Court of Appeals in light of D'Amario. Id at 502.
This was because the Fourth District had held the trial court was in error by not putting the drunk driver on the
verdict form under Fabre. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Ferayorni, 795 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th
2001).
133.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2002).
134.
843 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 2003).
135.
Id. at 338.
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the seat belt system upon the occurrence of a frontal collision.'3 6 Upon a frontal
impact, plaintiff argued, a reclined seatback enabled the passenger to move forward
and be injured as if they were unrestrained.137 When reclined on the front seatback
the shoulder belt of the restraint system no longer contacts or restrains the upper
torso, and the occupant "submarines" or slips down under the lap belt due to the
reclined angle between the belt webbing and the seat cushion.'
Griffin claimed to have his front passenger seatback reclined 45 degrees
rearward while sleeping, but still wearing his seatbelt.' 39 His vehicle was being
driven by a friend.140 It was not disputed that the driver fell asleep at the wheel.141
As the vehicle drifted off the side of the roadway on 1-10 near Tallahassee, the
rumble strips woke up the driver, and then by his own testimony Griffin also
awoke and reached up from the reclined seatback across to his left to grab for the
steering wheel, however, he did not actually touch the wheel. 4 2
Griffin claimed the vehicle ran into a cherry tree at the right front portion of the
car and then careened off and came to rest against another tree. 14 3 It was pivotal to
Griffm's claim that a frontal impact occurred since the asserted defect of the
reclined seatback was based only upon a frontal crash.
Griffin's lawyers contended, accordingly, because he was leaning back on the
reclined seatback when the vehicle hit the first tree he was caused to slide under his
lap belt, and then pivoted upward and forward. This enabled the shoulder belt,
which was now positioned away from his chest due to his reclined position, to
clothesline his neck causing the cervical spinal cord injury.'4
The defendant manufacturer's version of the crash was the antithesis of what
was just stated. It claimed the Kia rolled over and never had a frontal impact to the
first tree, or any other type of frontal impact as claimed. 14 5 More importantly,
Griffin was not even on his reclined passenger seatback once he awoke, reached up
and over to grab the steering wheel. 146 Consequently, he was no longer in a reclined
position against the seatback at the time of any kind of crash, so the facts did not
support the defect claim.14 7 Griffin's cervical spinal cord injury occurred, the
defense argued, when his head impacted the interior of the roof while he was
inverted during the rollover sequence. 148 In other words, his head hit the roof

Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Jennifer M. Faye, SEAT BELTS, Essential to Driver
138.
http://www.sfifoundation.com/seatbelt.html (last updated June 14, 2012).
Id
139.
140.
Id at 337.
Id
141.
142.
Id at 338.
Id
143.
See Griffin, 843 So. 2d at 338.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
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supported by
the ground during the rollover, just like diving into a hard surface
49

head first.1

Griffin was tried, prior to D'Amario, in May 2001 .150 There was a verdict for
the defendant. 51 The trial judge allowed into evidence what happened in the
causation of the underlying crash with the driver falling asleep, and Griffin's role
in reaching up and grabbing the steering wheel.15 2 The driver was also put on the
verdict form as a Fabre defendant, as was Griffin himself.15 3 D'Amario was
decided during the pendency of Griffin's appeal. 154 The First District reversed the
defense verdict under D'Amario because the accident causing first tortfeasors had
been put on the verdict form as a Fabredefendant.' 5 1 Yet, on remand, according to
the Griffin decision, the jury would first have to determine whether the Kia rolled
over or hit the cherry tree in a frontal collision as the plaintiff claimed.156 On this
issue the defendant manufacturer would be allowed to put into evidence the driver
falling asleep, Griffin's own conduct in reaching for the steering wheel, and
arguably grabbing it, which played a role in the loss of control.1 57 According to the
First District in Griffin, if the jury on remand found it was a rollover, the defendant
manufacturer would prevail.'" 8 However, if the jury determined it was a frontal
impact to the Kia, the manufacturer could still as a defense offer evidence that the
seatback did not play a causative role in enhancing Griffin's injury.159 Although
unstated in the opinion, presumably all of this would have to take place in a
bifurcated or multiple-phased trial.160 No certiorari was taken to the Florida
Supreme Court by either party, although arguably the First District Court's
decision could be considered in direct conflict with D'Amario/Nash, or at least
adding more confusion.' 6 '
Most assuredly, the Florida Supreme Court likely did not anticipate that
D'Amario might be used in non-motor vehicle cases. Their interpretation of the
crashworthiness doctrine, to be sure because of previous cases, would be
149.
Id ("[Injuries occurred when his head smashed into the interior roof of the car."). One description of
this type of injury mechanism and rollovers can be found at Parenteau & Shah, Driver Injuries in U S. SingleEvent Rollovers, S.A.E. 2000-01-0633. Therein it is stated:
Ground impact phase-as the vehicle impacts the ground, the occupant will continue to move in its initial velocity,
heading towards the vehicle interior. ... Spinal injuries occurred when drivers were outboard passengers, and not
when drivers were inboard passengers. Spinal injuries in a rollover are often associated with a "diving-type" injury
mechanism. The kinematics of the inboard and outboard passengers is somewhat different in a rollover. The
outboard passenger moves along a larger radius than the inboard passenger does. The energy for the outboard
passenger is thus higher than for the inboard passenger. . ...
The belt may potentially keep the spine aligned with
the head. As the occupant torso dives towards the struck area, spinal injury may potentially result.
Id at 2, 7.
150.
Griffin, 843 So. 2d at 336; D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 424.
151.
Griffin, 843 So. 2d at 336.
152.
Id. at 337-38.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 336.
155.
Id. at 337.
156.
Id. at 339.
157.
Griffin, 843 So. 2d at 339.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id at 336.
161.
Compare Grifin, 843 So. 2d 336, with D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
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anticipated to apply to motorcycles and to perhaps other types of motorized
products. Yet, the idea of a successive tort and the enhancement of damages
discussed in D'Amario was attempted to be applied in several other types of cases,
which were totally unrelated to motor vehicle crashes.1 62 There have been two
prominent examples. 163 One dealt with trying to apply D'Amario to a situation
involving a death in a nursing home by attempting to separate the issue of allowing
a patient to become dehydrated, and/or the medical malpractice related to it.' 6" In
other words, the case was trying to analogize enhanced injuries to successive torts
caused by another. The case was Jackson v. York Hanover Nursing Centers. 65
In that case, the intermediate appellate court had to decide whether D'Amario
applied so the damages that may have been caused by the lack of fluids resulting in
dehydration could be distinguished from the medical care subsequently rendered by
the nursing home.' 66 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal held that, in
distinguishing the application of D'Amario, there could be joint tortfeasors in
apportionment of damages in that particular wrongful death case.167 The Jackson
court specifically dealt with the contended analogy of two accidents or two events,
one which enhanced the injury caused by the initial dehydration, but not the
subsequent medical malpractice.1 68 Jackson grappled with the issue of a successive
Fabre defendant's inclusion on the verdict form, despite D'Amario.169 The court
stated: "In a nutshell, we are asked whether the Florida Supreme Court's holding in
D'Amario v. Ford Motor Company applies to the facts of this case. If D'Amario
applies, an apportionment pursuant to Fabrewas improper. We conclude, however,
that D'Amario is not applicable, and affirm." 70
The nursing home defendant in Jackson, as an affirmative defense, raised the
contention that the medical center was negligent in the care and treatment of the
decedent prior to her admission to the facility operated by the nursing home.' 7' Of
course, D'Amario had held that one could not make a Fabre defendant in a two
collision or two accident case.17 2 The issue in Jackson was that "Johnson [the
decedent] was dehydrated, an action that in [the expert's] opinion fell below the
standard of care." 73 The question became whether the ultimate death was the result
of the dehydrated state while in the nursing home or the medical center who "failed
to complete an 'Input-Output' form which would have identified the malabsorption
problem and indicated that Ms. Johnson [the decedent] was dehydrated ... .174 in
other words, who killed Johnson?
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See cases cited infra notes 171, 183.
See cases cited infra notes 171, 183.
See case cited infra note 171.
876 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 2004).
Id. at 12.
Id.atl2-13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
Jackson, 876 So. 2d at 10.
D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 2001).
Jackson, 876 So. 2d at 10.
Id.
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The jury ultimately assessed 75% to the medical center, and 25% to the nursing
home.' 7 5 The Jackson court made a critical distinction between its facts to that of
D'Amario. A lengthy quote from the court's opinion is illustrative:
"[U]nlike automobile accidents involving damages solely arising
from the collision itself, a defendant's liability in a
crashworthiness case is predicated upon the existence of a distinct
and second injury caused by a defective product, and assumes the
plaintiff to be in the condition to which he is rendered after the
first accident.

. .

. Thus, crashworthiness cases involve separate

and distinct injuries-those caused by the initial collision, and
those subsequently caused by a second collision arising from a
defective product. We agree that when viewed in this light,
crashworthiness cases may be analogized to medical malpractice
cases involving a successive negligent medical provider who is
alleged to have either aggravated an existing injury or caused a
separate and additional injury."
It appears, therefore, that D'Amario only applies in Ms. Johnson's
case if there were two distinguishable injuries, one caused by the
Medical Center, and either a second separate and distinct injury
caused by the Nursing Home, or an aggravation by the Nursing
Home of an existing injury to Ms. Johnson originally caused by the
Medical Center.
The limited record that we have of the proceedings below,
however, indicates that both the Medical Center and the Nursing
Home were dealing with a continuum of the same injury. The
testimony reflects that Ms. Johnson was dehydrated while in the
Medical Center; was still dehydrated when she left the Medical
Center; and continued to be dehydrated during her days at the
Nursing Home's facility. The trial court, in allowing damages to be
apportioned by the jury in accordance with Fabre, concluded on
the basis of the substantial competent evidence adduced at trial that
there was only a single injury, and accordingly, that D'Amario did
not apply. We think the trial judge got it right.

Section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1999), deals with apportionment
of damages, and in cases to which this particular section applies,
the court must enter judgment against each party liable on the basis
of each party's percentage of fault, and not on the basis of the
175.

Id.
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doctrine of joint and several liability . . . . This section applies to
negligence cases, including professional malpractice cases. In
Fabre,the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the term, "party," to
include all persons who contributed to the accident "regardless of
whether they have been or could have been joined as defendants."

Whether defendants are joint tortfeasors is ordinarily a question of
fact determined by the circumstances of the particular case. In the
instant case, as we have noted, there is only one injury, that being
the death of Ms. Johnson by malabsorption of liquids and
consequent dehydration, and the jury saw fit to apportion the
damages. Moreover, as we have earlier indicated, there was
sufficient evidence produced reflecting that the Medical Center
and the attending physician at the Medical Center acted in concert
with the Nursing Home to cause the single injury. Under these
circumstances we conclude that no error was committed by the
trial judge in allowing an apportionment of the damages suffered

by Ms. Johnson.176
Florida's Third District Court of Appeals also dealt with D'Amario in a
completely unrelated context to motor vehicle crashes. This case was Sta-Rite
Industries,Inc. v. Levey.177 Levey was clearly a tragic case. A fourteen year-old boy
drowned and suffered severe "brain injuries" when an unsecured protective grate
had been removed from a swimming pool.17 8 The teenager "was caught in the
powerful suction of the exposed drain." 79 Numerous rescuers could not free him
from the drain.' 80 "By the time the suction was released . .. almost twelve minutes
had passed.

. .

. [and] [t]he boy was catastrophically brain damaged. . . .

The

Third District Court of Appeals reversed a verdict and ordered a new trial. 82
Sta-Rite was the manufacturer of the pump.183 There was also a claim as to a
Fabre defendant, the owner and maintenance company, for negligence in not
properly maintaining and operating the pool.18 4 The court reversed the verdict,
holding "[w]e also conclude that the damage verdict cannot stand and that any new
trial must involve the issues, not only of the respective responsibilities of Sta-Rite,
the owner, and maintenance company, but of damages as well."' 85 The court
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
909 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 2005).
Id. at 903.
Id
Id.
Id.

182.

Id. at 909.

183.
184.
185.

Levey, 909 So. 2d at 903.
Id.
Id. at 903.
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concluded there was a fundamental error committed by the trial court in
apportionment of liability between Sta-Rite, the pool owner, and the maintenance
company respectively. 86 The plaintiff had argued, and the trial judge accepted, that
under D'Amario there was a two accident event in causing the plaintiffs death. 1 7
That is, the teenager's
injuries resulted from two separate "accidents"-the first occurring
when his arm was initially caught in the suction of the exposed
drain, and the second when (after a second or two passed without
significant harm)-the suction was not released as it would have if
such a device had been installed, so that Lorenzo remained caught
for the extended period which resulted in his injuries. 18
The trial court stated that the claim against Sta-Rite, as the manufacturer, was
based upon a second accident theory in which there could be no Fabre defense in
accordance with D'Amario.'89 The Third District determined there was not a two
accident case here.' 9 0
It was indeed a strange theory because of the attempted application of the
crashworthiness doctrine to a situation where a little boy almost drowned in a
swimming pool on a claim of both a service maintenance issue to the pump on the
drain in the pool, and the drain itself, a long way from the motor vehicle
crashworthiness theory's underpinnings.
Finally, outside other jurisdictions who have examined the D'Amario decision,
even some of those jurisdictions who at the time of D'Amario were also minority
view forums, have since rejected Florida's decision making in the field.' 9'

186.
Id. at 906.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.; see Roth, Second Collision, supra note 1, at 20-27; Roth, Burden ofProof Conundrum, supra note
1, at 10-18.
189.
Levey, 909 So. 2d at 906.
190.
Id. at 906-07.
191.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa overruled a previous ruling upon which, coincidentally, the
D'Amario court relied. Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Iowa 2009). Iowa reversed its earlier
holding, adopting essentially the position of this author and opting for the majority instead of the minority
positions. Id. at 560-61. The previous Iowa decision was specifically relied upon by the majority in D'Amario v.
Ford as support for its acceptance of the minority position. 806 So. 2d at 433-34. The case D'Amario relied on
was Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Iowa 1992). The D Amario court quoted from Reed as follows:
The theory [crashworthiness], which presupposes the occurrence of accidents precipitated
for myriad reasons, focuses alone on the enhancement of resulting injuries. The rule does
not pretend that the design defect had anything to do with causing the accident. It is enough
if the design defect increased the damages. So any participation by the plaintiff in bringing
the accident about is quite beside the point.
Id. at 434 (quoting Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230).
Reed was overruled in 2009 by the Iowa Supreme Court in Jahn, 773 N.W.2d at 559-60 (Iowa 2009).
In Jahn, the court reviewed D Amario as the main proponent of the minority position. Id. at 555. The Jahn case
recognized that Iowa was now a state of pure comparative negligence. Id. at 560. It believed that comparative fault
law would adequately handle issues arising in enhanced injury cases. Id Reed was also a case, like D Amario,
which involved intoxication. Id. at 558. The Jahn court believed it had to make a decision between the various
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4. How Motor Vehicle Crashworthiness Cases Are Being Tried In Post
D'Amario Courtrooms
The legal concept of crashworthiness is simple enough, and even persuasive in
the abstract. Stated in lay language, a manufacturer can only be held liable for
those injuries caused by a defect which occurs after the initial accident.' 92 Those
injuries must be enhanced, increased, or made greater from what they would have
been resultant from that first collision, but for the alleged crashworthiness defect
which enhanced the injury severity.'93
A manufacturer, on the other hand, is not an insurer in protecting against all
injuries.19 4 The second collision, apart from the first accident in this equation, is
generally considered one between the occupant and some interior portion of the
motor vehicle.195 For example, the occupant would collide with the steering wheel,
positions of Huddell or Fox-Mitchell, which the Reed court never addressed. Id. at 559. Jahn reversed Reed and
changed its law to follow the majority position. Id. at 560. That court stated as follows:
We recognize, however, that in cases where the factfinder has found a divisible injury, the
liability of the product manufacturer, though subject to comparative fault analysis, is limited
to the amount of the divisible injury. Having found that the comparative fault provisions of
Iowa Code chapter 668 apply to enhanced injury cases, it follows that the joint and several
liability provisions of Iowa Code section 668.4 apply to parties liable for divisible or
indivisible injuries.
In light of the Restatement (Third), the evolving case law from other jurisdictions, and our
duty to interpret Iowa Code chapter 668 in accordance with the legislative intent revealed by
its language, we overrule Reed and align our law with the Restatement (Third) and the
majority ofjurisdictions.
We adopt the Fox-Mitchell approach to the required causation in enhanced injury cases.
We further hold that the principles of comparative fault and joint and several liability found
in Iowa Code chapter 668 apply in enhanced injury cases. As a result, the answer to both
certified questions is "Yes."
Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
The plaintiffs dispute the use of the nomenclature "enhanced injury." The phrase is simply a
convenient label, however, and has no independent significance. It represents that portion of
total damages for which a product manufacturer may be liable in a multiparty action
involving an initial cause unrelated to a product defect.
Id. at 553, n.1.
In another state case decided since D'Amario, one of first impression, Dannenfelser v. Daimler
Chrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1092-93. (D. Haw. 2005), a federal district court in Hawaii, while
recognizing the lead minority position represented by D Amario, rejected its decision, granted in part and denied a
part a summary judgment. However, the court in Dannenfelser specifically rejected the D'Amario rationale on
comparative fault not being part of a crashworthiness case. Id. at 1097; see Mary E. Murphy, Comparative
Negligence of a Driver as Defense to Enhanced Injury, Crashworthiness, or Second Collision Claim, 69 A.L.R.
626 (1999).
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 439.
192.
Id. at 439-40, 442-43.
193.
Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201, 204 (Fla. 1976).
194.
Foland, supra note I1, at 600 n.2 (citations omitted).
195.
The terms "second collision" and "second impact" are apparently adopted from automobile
cases involving sequential collisions, but, as used in this article, the terms refer to the
striking of an area or part of the interior or exterior of the vehicle after the original impact of
the vehicle with another object.
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instrument panel, or roof pillars.196 Although Larsen and other early
crashworthiness decisions did not necessarily discuss this, the second collision or
impact (occupant to car interior) could also be an impact from an installed safety
device. This might involve a failed seatbelt which upon the crash becomes
disengaged or breaks, an airbag which deployed or failed to deploy, or a padded
interior component, just to name a few.197 The crashworthiness concept could also
be with an exterior object if a seatbelt failed to properly restrain the occupant and
there was an ejection or partial ejection from the vehicle. This often happens in
rollovers.' 98 The design of the motor vehicle to protect an occupant has to be only
against reasonably foreseeable risks.1 99 In other words, the crash protection
capabilities have to provide reasonable protection, not absoluteness.
However, if one were to look at the legal theory underlying the
crashworthiness doctrine, the details must be flushed out in a jury trial where all
the facts can be examined. Experts ultimately opine to the jury whether the design
was defective by not providing reasonable protection, and what the enhanced
Id
196.
Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1978) (claim for defective dashboards); Jeng v. Witters, 452
F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978), af'd., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (claim for defective door latch applying
Pennsylvania law); Toliver v. Gen. Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1985) (claim for an alleged defective fuel
tank); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973) (steering wheel claim); Sumnicht v. Toyota
Motor Sales, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984) (alleged defect in a seat system); see Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (claim for roof defect which enhanced an injury); Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1974).
197.
See Automotive Coal. for Traffic Safety, Inc., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT AIRBAGS (Nov.
2002), www.nhtsa.dot.gov. There has been a strong concerted effort on the part of anti-industry and consumer
proponents to establish causes of action and claims for airbag-related injuries and deaths. See generally PARENTS
FOR SAFER AIRBAGS, THE AIRBAG CRISIS: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (1st ed. 1997); see also Higgs v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 655 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 815 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (claiming that the airbags enhanced
injuries). Obviously, what constitutes an unreasonable risk, or foresecability in terms of imposing liability on the
manufacturer will vary from case to case. In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagen, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir.
1974), the court attempted to define these concepts as follows:
The mere fact, however, that automobile collisions are frequent enough to be foreseeable is
not sufficient in and of itself to create a duty on the part of the manufacturer to design its car
to withstand such collisions under any circumstances. Foreseeability, it has been many
times repeated, is not to be equated with duty; it is, after all, but one factor, albeit an
important one, to be weighed in determining the issue of duty.

The key phrase in the statement of the Larsen rule is "unreasonablerisk of injury in the
event of a collision", not foreseeability of collision.... Whether or not this has occurred
should be determined by general negligence principles, which involve a balancing of the
likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens against the burden of the
precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm.. . . In every case, the utility and
purpose of the particular type of vehicle will govern in varying degree the standards of
safety to be observed in its design.
Id at 1070, 1071-72.
198.
See E. Moffatt et al., Head Excursion of Seat Belted Cadaver, Volunteer, and Hybrid III ATD In a
Dynamic/Static Rollover Fixture,in STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Soc'y of Auto. Eng'rs 1997)
[hereinafterHeadExcursion].
199.
Courts will usually talk about reasonableness in terms of the obligation or duty imposed upon a
manufacturer to protect occupants in a collision, or to design their products to protect individuals in crashes. See
Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Indiana law); Haberkorn v.
Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 379-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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injuries were or were not.2"o These trials usually boil down to a battle between
experts. In the daily grind of courtroom adversity, a crashworthiness defense is
usually that the injuries-however tragic-occurred because of the severity of the
first crash, high speed/velocity, and energy forces; that is, they would have resulted
anyway due to the severity or circumstances involved in that first collision.
Correspondingly, in the courtroom plaintiffs' attorneys usually strive to minimize
the severity and speed of that first impact, while defense counsel seek to prove it to
be as severe as possible. The higher the speed of the crash, the greater the risk or
probability of serious injury and death. 2 0 1 Two old adages are at work here. First,
speed kills. Second, it is not how fast you are going-it is how fast you stop!
For the person reading this article, the thought might have occurred by now
that perhaps the crashworthiness theory has never been as easy to apply as its black
letter statement note infers. Here is an example of common situation involving a
rollover crash. Usually, they are single vehicle crashes-meaning no other vehicle
played a role in causing the rollover to occur.202 Rollovers are statistically high
fatality events.203 Plaintiffs' attorneys, to the contrary, argue rollover accidents are
very mild events in terms of injury exposures. 20 Plaintiffs' experts contend that
whether it is one complete roll, or several, the impacts within each rotational
revolution, as it affects occupant exposure to injury, is very mild. 20 5 Thus, when an
injury occurs it is from a minor exposure to forces experienced due to the rollover,
In cases alleging an enhanced or increased injury it is very common, if not an absolute necessity, that
200.
expert witnesses are called to testify as to what the injuries would have been without the alleged defect. See, e.g.,
May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 509 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Or. 1973); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991).
As one early commentator stated: "The burden of proof of enhanced injury, being an essential element of the
plaintiffs case, must rest upon the plaintiff. Competent expert testimony, sufficient to provide the jury with a
reasonable basis for apportioning the injury, is required to sustain this burden." Foland, supra note 11, at 621; see
also Harris,supranote 43, at 661-65.
The Vickles and Oldham article is more technical than general law review articles. So is the Harris
201.
article in the North Carolina Law Review. According to Vickles and Oldham:
In practice, because of the laws of physics and principles of energy management, it is often
difficult to distinguish between so-called "accident-causing" and "injury-enhancing"
conduct. The enhancement of injuries runs hand in hand with the severity of the accident.
For example, each incremental increase in speed results in a corresponding increase in crash
consequences because the forces unleashed in the crash are magnified exponentially. Thus,
any conduct which influences the severity of an accident, thereby constituting a proximate
cause of enhanced injury, should be compared with a manufacturer's fault.
Vickles & Oldham, supra note 34, at 439-40 (footnotes omitted).
See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), Rating System for Rollover Resistance: An
202.
Assessment, Transp. Research Bd., Nat'l. Research Council, Special Rpt. No. 265, at 9-10 (2002).
For general information on rollover causes and injuries resulting from them, see PassengerRollover
203.
TOPTEC: Causes, Prevention and Injury Prevalence,Society ofAutornotive Engineers, April 22-23, 2002 (S.A.E.
Continuing Professional Development Group). For a rollover/roof crush discussion, see Department of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), Docket No. NHTSA-1999-5572; Notice 2
(Roof Crush Resistance).
The plaintiffs' theories on rollover/roof crush lacking of severity, and defects associated with roof
204.
structures can be found in Donald Friedman & Carl Nash, Advanced Roof Designfor Rollover Protection,(Geo.
Wash. Univ. Working Paper No. 01-512-W-94), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd01/Esv/esvl7/Proceed/00006.pdf.
205.
See Mark P. Robinson & Kevin F. Calcagnie, Vehicle Roof Crush Persists During Rollover Crashes,
AAJ TRIAL (Aug. 2000); James J. Murphy, ProvingRollover CrashworthinessClaims, AAJ TRIAL (Feb. 1998).
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so that the defect-be it roof strength to seatbelts 20 6-fmust have caused an
enhanced injury to result. Usually it is a claim that the roof crushed down and
impacted the head and neck of the occupant causing a serious injury or death. This
sequence is the butfor conclusion. In turn, plaintiffs' biomechanical experts simply
testify that had the rollover not occurred-the first collision if you will-the
occupant would not have been injured or killed.20 7
On the contrary, the defense of the vehicle manufacturer concentrates on the
severity of a rollover crash.2 0 8 The forces that occur within each revolution or
rollover are what exposes the occupants to severe injuries, even if wearing
seatbelts.2 09 For example, a person within a vehicle wearing a seatbelt can still
impact the roof causing a cervical or neck injury due to augmented loading (the
head stopping and the body continuing), and this can occur absent a defect before
the roof crushes downward, regardless of the vehicle type. 210 Although it seems
counterintuitive, tests have shown that even before the roof crushes down to impact
an occupant in a rollover, the injury to the head or neck of the occupant has already
occurred. 2 1 1 The other issue which arises, unless people are prepared to wear five
point belt systems like NASCAR drivers, is that no conventional seatbelt can keep
an occupant's head, for example, from extending past the window plane and
coming into contact with the pavement or ground, or being crushed while the
vehicle is rolling over. Consequently, an occupant's head also can extend beyond
the plane of the window during a rollover, or be partially or completely ejected,
even when wearing a seatbelt. 2 12 All of this can occur even when the various safety
features of the motor vehicle perform perfectly.2 13 Seatbelts are three point belts.
They cannot restrain a head in all crashes.2 14

206.
Florida Statute section 316.614 (2012) requires every driver and front seat passenger in a motor vehicle
to be restrained by a safety belt. The statute also states that a violation shall not constitute negligence per se, or to
be used as primafacie evidence of negligence or in mitigation of damages. Id. However, failure to wear a seatbelt
can be considered as evidence of comparative negligence. Id. There should be single calculation for comparative
negligence with regard to failure to use a seatbelt on the verdict form. Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d
934 (Fla. 1996). Seatbelts have also been shown to be effective in reducing fatalities in rollovers. Parenteau, supra
note 155, at 7. For a plaintiffs viewpoint and discussion of seatbelts, see THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INC., THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 42-55 (1985).
207.
See Glen Rains & Joseph Kanianthra, Determination of the Significance of Roof Crush on Head and
Neck Injury to PassengerVehicle Occupants in Rollover Crashes, S.A.E. Paper No. 950655 (1995).
208.
For the general defense perspective of how people get injured and the severity or rollovers, see Kenneth
Orlowski, Thomas Bundorf & Edward Moffatt, Rollover Crash Tests The Influence ofRoofStrength on Injury
Mechanics, S.A.E. Paper No. 851734 (1985); Edward Moffatt, Kenneth Orlowski & J. E. Stocke, Rollover and
Drop Tests-The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury Mechanics Using Belted Dummies, S.A.E. Paper No.
902314 (1990); see also Robert Larson et al., Vehicle Rollover Testing, Methodologies in Recreating Rollover
Collisions, S.A.E. Paper No. 2000-01-1641 (severity of rollovers).
209.
See infra note 216.
210.
Edward Moffatt & Jeya Padmanaban, The Relationship Between Roof Strength and Occupant Strength
in Rollover Accident Data 79 (Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. Report No. FAAA-SF-R-95-05-37, 1995); G. S.
Bahling et al., Rollover and Drop Tests-The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury Mechanics Using Belted
Dummies, S.A.E. Paper No. 902314 (1990).
211.
See infra note 218.
212.
See generally Parenteau,supra note 149; Head Excursion,supranote 198.
213.
HeadExcursion, supra note 198.
214.
Id.
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These second collision appellate decisions, especially like D'Amario, usually
rationalize this result by saying that the liability of the manufacturer is only for the
enhanced injury.215 There is no liability for any injuries arising from the first crash.
However, in the real world of trying a crashworthiness case to a jury this
distinction is one without a difference. It is not so easy to separate either by
testimony, or evidence, the first crash from the second crash.
5. How Motor Vehicle Crash Injuries Occur in the Real World
An enhanced injury event cannot occur, nor can it otherwise exist, without the
underlying first collision. That first collision dictates what type of second injury, or
risk of an increased injury event, might occur. 2 16 There must be a first collision
crash to have a second collision defect enhanced harm. Yet, as will be shown, the
sine qua non between the two essentially transpires at the same time. Although the
crashworthiness analogy to subsequent medical malpractice is nice, in cases such
as D'Amario, and tidy from a theoretical standpoint, it does not hold up in terms of
how people are actually injured or killed, enhanced or not, in motor vehicle
crashes.217
To make the point about how motor vehicle crash injuries occur, from a
technical standpoint, reliance for this sub-section argument comes from published
work by experts who usually testify on behalf of plaintiffs in these crashworthiness

215.
"Enhanced injury refers to the degree by which a defect aggravates collision injuries beyond those
which would have been sustained because of the impact or collision absent the defect." AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D,
PRAC. AIDS § 695 (2013).
216.
According to experts to plaintiffs' attorneys,
decelerations that occur immediately after the initial impact can damage living tissue
without the occupant striking any feature of the vehicle interior. These can be termed firstcollision injuries. Tissue can be damaged by decelerative forces imparted to an occupant
ejected from the vehicle upon striking the ground or some object outside the vehicle; and
these can be termed third-collisioninjuries.
Robert Brenner & Bruce Enz, Classification of Information Generated in a Motor Vehicle Crash Sequence, in
ANTHONY J. SANCES ET AL., MECHANISMS OF HEAD AND SPINE TRAUMA 99 (1986) (emphasis added).

Generally, the legal commentators in this area discussing the various nuances of crashworthiness have
217.
not been very technical in their approach. They only discuss generally the legal issues from a sterile, antiseptic
perspective. One early exception to this was W. James Foland's article. See Foland, supra note I1, at 616-19.
However, in that article it was only simplistically recognized that these types of cases would involve issues of
occupant kinematics and biomechanics in the nature of reconstruction, and medical testimony on human impact
tolerance. Id. at 617; but see Harris, supra note 43, at 668-69 n.178-81, (where some tacit appreciation was
recognized for some of the technical issues in these crashworthiness cases). There was no engineering or
biomechanical-type of detail with respect to how injuries occur in collisions. See Michael Hoenig, Understanding
"Second Collision" Cases in New York, 20 N.Y. L. FORUM 28, 52-54 (1974); see also Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F.
Supp. 105, 109 (D. N.J. 1973) (there was no medical testimony in terms of human body impact tolerances).
Michael Hoenig, a practicing PL attorney with the Herzfeld & Rubin firm in New York, often discusses a
technical understanding, as a practicing attorney in the field of crashworthiness, in his legal articles. See, e.g.,
Michael Hoenig, Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 633 (1981); MICHAEL
HOENIG, PRODUCT LIABILITY: SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL AND POLICY ISSUES 791-93 (Product Liability

Advisory Council Foundation 1992).
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cases. 2 18 The fact is that injuries which result from a first collision, whether
enhanced or not, take place temporally simultaneous with the underlying crash.
The so-called second collision between the occupant and the vehicle interior,
or a component part including seat belts or airbags,219 is an instantaneous event to
the first crash. When, for example, a motor vehicle is involved in a frontal impact
the following events transpire:
All of the deformation of metal, all of the tearing and crushing of
flesh occurs, quite literally, in the blink of an eye. In about one
tenth of a second, to be precise.
In order to study this relatively brief time period we divide it into
units of one-thousandths of a second, called "milliseconds." Thus a
typical frontal [automobile] crash begins and is over in about 100
to 120 milliseconds, the duration increasing with increasing
vehicle curb weight and with increasing delta v; ("delta v" is
further defined below and should be taken to mean an essentially
instantaneous change in velocity). 2 20
The way the human body moves in a motor vehicle crash from the collision
forces created is called kinematics. 2 2 1 In a thirty miles per hour (mph) frontal
impact, to continue this example, for an unrestrained driver and front seat occupant
who began to move forward from the crash force in a seated position their knees
make contact with the lower IP (dash) in sixty milliseconds; driver contact with the
steering wheel occurs in seventy-five milliseconds; and the windshield is struck in
ninety milliseconds. 22 2 A millisecond is one-thousandth of a second. One thousand
milliseconds equal one second.
The movement of a seatbelt restrained driver in a frontal crash will still contact
the dash and have his or her head strike the steering wheel within seventy-five and
ninety milliseconds respectively. 223 The so-called kinematics, or movements of the
218.
The necessity for expert witnesses and the reliance upon them in technical cases, such as products
liability litigation, has spawned the term junk science. See What is Junk Science?, JUNKSCIENCE.COM,
http://junkscience.com/what-is-junk-science/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). As a result, particularly the Federal
courts began to more closely scrutinize the scientific basis and foundation for expert testimony. See, e.g., Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Florida state courts follow the Frye rule. Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953). Dr. Alvin Hyde testifies on behalf
of attorneys representing plaintiffs. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Chandler, 882 S.W.2d 606, 612 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994).
219.
Airbags deploy in 1/20th of a second (faster than the blink of an eye) at speeds between 90 and 211
MPH with a force up to 2600 lbs. per square inch. See THE AIRBAG CRISIS, supra note 193, at XIV. Various
plaintiffs' attomeys' associated advocacy organizations have been critical of airbag designs and defenses. See
generally RICHARD M.GOODMAN & CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY § 1:4 (3d ed.
1991) (Crashworthiness, § 1:8).
220.

A. HYDE, CRASH INJURIES: HOW AND WHY THEY HAPPEN A PRIMER FOR ANYONE WHO CARES

ABOUT PEOPLE INCARS 6 (Hyde Assocs., Inc. 1992) (emphasis added).
221.
Occupant kinematics would be defined as "[t]hat phase of mechanics which deals with the possible
motions of a material body." DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 781 (24th ed. 1965).
222.
HYDE, supra note 220, at 8, Fig. IA, B.
223.
Id. at 9, Fig. 2.
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occupant's body within the vehicle due to the energy forces of the accident, has
also been described by one plaintiff expert this way, in a hypothetical frontal
barrier thirty mph crash:
At zero time (0 ms, or 0 milliseconds) the front of the car has just
contacted the barrier. By 90 ms the front of the car has been
crushed about 2 feet; which is to say that the car has essentially
stopped its forward motion. During this brief period the occupantdummy continues its forward travel at 30 miles per hour (about 44
feet per second), its forward motion impeded only slightly by the
friction between the dummy's bottom and the seat pan, until it
strikes its knees into the dashboard at about 60 milliseconds,
causing the lower body to abruptly stop its forward travel and
causing the upper torso to flex (bend forward), the upper torso
striking the steering assembly at about 75 ms into the crash.
The head and neck flex further when the chest strikes the steering
wheel and then contact (often passing into and through) the plane
of the windshield, shattering the windshield, and, on occasion,
parts of the head and face too, at about 90 milliseconds. Another
way to visualize this is to understand that the crash started out with
the head 2 feet or so from the windshield, at its "normal" driving
position. Then, in the crash event, the car stopped after 2 feet of
travel and the head after 4 feet of travel. Clear? If not, you ought to
re-read and reflect upon this section on slow-motion collision
*224
kinematics.
The duration of time for injury causation or an injury, including death, to occur
in an accident, and the amount of crash forces explain why and how people receive
their injuries:
[F]or an impact occurring in the time realm of about 100
milliseconds (i.e., 0.1 seconds) which is the time for a usual
automotive crash and occurs in figure 10 at the lower left corner of
the "Zone of Injury or Death", velocity changes less than about 80
feet per second and peak accelerations of 20 G or less (occurring
for 100 milliseconds) are probably safe, which is to say,
survivable. Similarly, a 20 millisecond impact with a delta v below
80 feet per second is probably survivable even at 200 G. Or a 20 G
accelerative load for 10 seconds is survivable even at velocity
changes as great as 10,000 feet per second.225

224.
225.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 40.
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Knowing the physics involved in these car crashes, one would strain credibility
to be able to analogize a motor vehicle to a subsequent medical malpractice event
occurring at some later time and date, perhaps days later. As one expert has
written:
[B]ecause we are just a bundle of tissues of differing
viscoelasticities, we respond to shorterduration impacts (less than
0.1 second) only in terms of velocity changes (i.e., in terms of
delta v) and to long duration impacts (greater than 0.1 second)
primarily in terms of acceleration changes, (i.e., in terms of G
units, or multiples of Earth's gravitational pull).

We have a rule here: for the average time epoch of a simple car
crash, the instantaneous change in velocity (delta v) is the best
predictor of injury severity or death.
However, the relationship between instantaneous change of
velocity and injury severity (from the point of view of threat-tolife) is neither linear nor necessarily applicable to any one
individual in any one crash. It is the probability of car occupant
injury or death that increases with increasing delta v of the vehicle.
To a large degree, that is all that you need to know about velocity
and injury or death.226
This temporal or time sequence uniqueness to motor vehicle crashes is not just
limited to frontal collisions. From the same sources as above, for side impacts the
total duration required for an injury to be caused is one hundred milliseconds.227
That time sequence is also true for rear end collisions.228 Head and neck injuries
also can occur in certain modes of crashes within even shorter time durations.229
The point is that a traditional crashworthiness case, despite these factors,
cannot be treated as some unique tort different from any other type of case when
evaluating comparative fault just because an enhanced defect is alleged. A
226.
Id. at 38.
227.
Id. at 250.
228.
Id. at 253-57.
229.
Although spinal injuries result from an injury mechanism with forces that are rotational, flexion, or
extension, for example, they all do occur nevertheless, in automobile crashes in the range of 100 to 200
milliseconds. Panjabi et al., Biomechanics ofSpinal Injuries, in ANTHONY J. SANCES, MECHANISMS OF HEAD AND
SPINE TRAUMA 247-60 (1986). Head injuries occur within milliseconds. This would be in a fraction of a second.
See Anthony Sances & Narayan Yoganandan, Human Head Injury Tolerance, in ANTHONY J. SANCES,
MECHANISMS OF HEAD AND SPINE TRAUMA 194-99 (1986). Scientific studies in the area of biomechanics of head

accelerations without impacts in a motor vehicle crash resulting in brain damage, also known as diffuse axonal
injury (DAI), have been on-going since the 1980s. Of course, necessary duration of the accelerations are within
milliseconds to cause these types of injuries. See Lawrence E. Thibault & Thomas A. Gennarelli, Biomechanicsof
Diffuse Brain Injuries, S.A.E. Paper No. 856022, 555-61 (1985).
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crashworthiness defect increased harm claim must-because of its very nature and
makeup as set forth above when the realities of a motor vehicle crash are examined
and understood-still be subject to comparative fault apportionment. 230 One way or
another, a jury has to separate the so-called "what the injury would have been"
from the "butfor enhanced injury due to an alleged crashworthiness defect." 2 3 1
There cannot be a second collision without a first collision initially occurring.
Therefore, it is an immutable proposition that in a crash case not considering the
circumstances of the first event creates an untenable result-one which is neither
accurate nor fair. When a motor vehicle crashes, the circumstances under which it
occurs are essential. It is the stopping of the vehicle due to an impact which
generates the forces that creates potential risks for injury. The maxim of "it's not
how fast you are going but how fast you stop" is applicable here. Although an
airliner lands at 150 mph its stopping distance is anywhere between one to two
miles; thus, passengers are not hurt and have a long duration of time to slow down
as they are going the same speed as the airplane at its landing. In an automobile
crash example, the vehicle traveling sixty mph stops its movement faster than in
one second of time for a frontal impact into another vehicle. Contrary to the
airplane analogy, the stopping distance of the vehicle is within a foot or so. For a
rear-end crash illustration, a car traveling fifty mph striking the rear of a stopped
vehicle, the person being hit is immediately accelerated forward from zero to
almost the impact speed before one can blink an eye. This differential in speed is
what causes the injuries or death in the example. In these instances people are
harmed.
6. Indivisible Injuries Were Considered Enhanced Injuries under
D'Amario
An issue which arguably arises in crashworthiness cases was that of an
indivisible injury. The D'Amario Court made reference to a situation where the socalled enhanced injuries cannot be separated out.2 32 In this area, the Florida
Supreme Court referenced Gross v. Lyons in a footnote. 23 3 It could be argued that
the Court anticipated the issue of an indivisible injury in crashworthiness cases
when they referred to that case. The Court in D'Amario said if the injuries could
not be separated the court must rely on the principle of Gross.234 In Gross v. Lyons,
a medical malpractice action, it was held that if the jury was not able to apportion
damages then any party who is found to be responsible is potentially liable for the
entire panoply of damages. 235 Basically, it fell back to joint and several liability
principles.
230.
It is recognized in the literature that determining what the enhanced, increased, aggravated or
exacerbated injury is in a crashworthiness case involves apportionment with regard to the injury. See Foland,
supra note 11, at 608, 615-16.
231.
Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1981).
232.
D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 440 n. 16 (Fla. 2001).
233.
Id.
234.
Id. at 443.
235.
763 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. 2000).
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What the Florida Supreme Court did not really address in D'Amario was the
issue of an indivisible injury, like death. This outcome is different from a jury not
being able to apportion damages. Even though the Nash case did involve a death,
the Court never addressed the nature of that injury-death and how it might impact
an enhanced injury analysis. Instead, death is a non-enhanced injury. You are either
dead, or you are not dead. Other Florida courts have previously held that death is
an indivisible injury.236 Out of state cases, even in an enhanced injury
crashworthiness situation, have found that the issue of death is an indivisible injury
not capable of apportionment of fault.237
It is a different burden of proof under Florida law, as recognized by the
Supreme Court itself, of a more likely than not standard in determining whether a
person died from the alleged negligence of a tortfeasor. 2 38 A corollary to this issue,
concerning the indivisibility of a death as an injury, also relates to another issue
which was not been addressed in Florida crashworthiness death cases. For
example, an asserted defense by the manufacturer defendant could be that the crash
was a "continuum", or a single event, and not the type of situation, for example, as
discussed in D'Amario's legal fiction of successive tortfeasors distinguishing the
first collision from the second collision.
The manufacturer, as a hypothesis, in a high speed rear-end motor vehicle
crash might contend that the severity of the crash, perhaps in this hypothetical
based upon a real case, was seventy-five mph and that the plaintiff died
immediately upon the impact. There was no so-called second collision and
therefore, crashworthiness principles did not apply. In D'Amario, one might
remember there was a distinct period of time after the first crash but before the
vehicle caught fire and the plaintiff was injured. 2 39 This is where the formerly
discussed Jackson and Sta-Rite opinions are helpful in distinguishing the enhanced
injury concept set forth in crashworthiness with pure apportionment of fault for the
ultimate injury.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at least touched upon this point, based
on Florida law, in Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. 24 0 This case involved the
maker of a child restraint seat. The co-defendant, Saturn Motors, argued there
was a simultaneous event due to the crash.242 The court held, despite D'Amario,
that where there was a "simultaneous" so-called "enhanced injury," the vehicle
manufacturer could seek apportionment of fault with Dorel, the maker of the child
seat, although the court did preclude Saturn from bringing into the suit the driver
who caused the initial crash. 243 Alternatively, the Bearint court did allow Saturn,
because it was a "simultaneous" event, whether it was an enhanced injury or not, to
236.
See, e.g., Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc.
v. Levey, 909 So. 2d 901, 907-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 2004).
237.
See Bass v. Gen. Motors Corp. 150 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 1998).
238.
Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1020-21.
239.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 427.
240.
389 F.3d 1339 (11 th Cir. 2004).
241.
Id. at 1343-44.
242.
Id. at 1344.
243.
Id. at 1347.
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argue the death was really caused by the child seat manufacturer because there was
but one crash which had occurred.244 In Bearint, Judge Barkett, a former Florida
Supreme Court Justice, wrote as follows:
The Bearints argue that D'Amario requires the exclusion of all
evidence of Saturn's fault in this case. They claim that the
"triggering event that causes the product to be tested" in this case
was not only the van colliding into the Saturn (and the Saturn
colliding into the Chevrolet Tahoe in front), but also the collapse
of the front seat due to its defective design. They contend that the
collapse of the front seat in a rear-impact crash is so foreseeable
that Cosco had a duty to design the Arriva to withstand that
impact, just as Ford had a duty to design the relay switch and seat
belt at issue in D'Amario to protect the car's occupants from a
reasonably foreseeable car crash. And because the fault of the
individuals causing the initial accidents was not at issue in
D'Amario, Saturn's fault in causing the collapse of the front seat
should similarly not be at issue in this case.
The Bearint's argument thus would distinguish the collapse of the
Saturn front seat back as a separate "collision" from the collision
of the Arriva with the front seat back as the Arriva rotated
upwards. However, this characterization of events is a departure
from the one taken by the Bearints throughout this case. The
Bearints consistently characterized the impact of the front seat
back with the Arriva as a single, simultaneous "enhanced injury"
event. Under this characterization, the crashworthiness doctrine
would only preclude evidence concerning the negligence of either
driver, not the negligence of Saturn. It was not until the Bearints
filed a supplemental memorandum supporting their motion to
preclude evidence regarding settlement with Saturn that the
Bearints argued that "Cosco should be precluded from attempting

to blame Saturn." 24 5
7. The Florida Legislature in 2011 Explicitly Overrules D'Amario
In continuing its long journey to abolish joint and several tort liability in
Florida, the Legislature in 2006 rewrote Florida Statute Section 768.81(3). Prior to
that time the Legislature had partially abolished joint and several liability, at least
as to non-economic damages, and had otherwise devised a very complicated
formula for determining comparative fault joint and several liability for economic

244.
245.

Id.
Id. at 1347-48 (footnotes omitted).

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013

33

Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

422

BarryLaw Review

Vol. 18, No. 2

damages.246 One would argue that even then the Legislature implicitly overruled
D'Amario in this statute since it pertained to products liability actions.
In revising Chapter 768.81 in 2006, and totally eliminating even modified joint
and several tort liability, the Florida Legislature clearly established as public policy
for this state that everyone was responsible for their own percentage of fault in
causing harm to another individual.247 This revision in 2006 was arguably
consistent with putting the adverse tortfeasor who caused the first collision in a
crashworthiness case on the verdict form, either directly when sued by a plaintiff or
as a Fabre defendant, thus contradicting D'Amario. The 2006 revisions to
768.81(3) fully codified the Fabre v. Marin decision and its progeny.248 On the
other hand, one could argue the reverse, ergo, that D'Amario v. Ford actually
overruled Fabrev. Marin.249
After fully reviewing the tapes and transcription of those legislative history
tapes of what the Florida Legislature intended in 2006 with regard to Section
768.81(3), no light was shed on whether they intended to affect the D'Amario
decision.250 Arguably, the 2006 revision of 768.81(3), coming after the 2001
decision in D'Amario, when the Legislature is presumed to have known about that
Florida Supreme Court decision, meant it could have putatively established as
public policy a different course of legal interpretation from the Supreme Court, and
in effect implicitly overruling D'Amario.251' But crashworthiness and D'Amario
were never mentioned.252 Thus, the argument lacked any substantial traction.
Having all potentially at fault parties on the verdict form is clearly consistent
with the public policy of Florida, established by the Florida Legislature, that
everyone must be responsible for their own actions. Therefore, the existence of an
adverse driver who causes the first collision, regardless of a claim of second
collision or enhancement of injury, and irrespective of the fact that the tortfeasor
causing the accident may have been drunk, does not mean there cannot still be
apportionment of fault for the injuries, enhanced or otherwise.

246.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2005); see Michael S. Hooker & Guy P. McConnell, Joint and Several
Liability in Florida: Are Reports of Its Demise Greatly Exaggerated?, 80 FLA. B.J. 11 (2006).
247.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2006).
248.
See FLA. STAT. §768.81 (2005); Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 1993).
249.
The Legislative history of the 2006 revision is unfortunately a mish mash of arguments. Their end
result is clear, how they got there is not. Fla. S. transcript of proceeding at pages 3, 4 (Mar. 30, 2006) (tape
recording available at Fla. Dept. of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (Senate Floor, Third Reading,
Debate and Vote on HB 145); Fla. S., transcript of proceedings at page 13 (Mar. 29, 2006) (tape recording
available at Fla. Dept. of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (Senate Floor, Second Reading and Debate on
HB 145). No doubt, however, products liability cases were expected to be included in the 2006 change. See H.B.
145, March 29, 2006, unofficial tr. at 13 (time 3:07:58); Senate Debate, March 30, 2006, unofficial tr. at 3, 4 (time
mark 45:40).
250.
See supra note 249.
251.
Contra, State ex rel. Housing Auth. of Plant City v. Kirk, 231 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1970) (changing in
construction placed on the statute by the courts, must be in unmistakable language). However, it is also presumed
as a matter of construction that the Legislature knows of a previous Supreme Court interpretation of a statute when
it reenacts or revises a particular statute. See Davis v. Simpson, 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1984);
Peninsular Supply Co. v. C. B. Day Realty of Fla., Inc., 423 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1982).
252.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2006).
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The revisions to Chapter 768.81(3) in 2006 were, yet, consistent with footnote
two of the D'Amario decision.2 53 That footnote referred to the possibility of the
plaintiff himself, or herself, being responsible for causing their own first collision
accident and therefore, being able to be placed on the verdict form to reduce
potential fault of the manufacturer.254 Thus, it would certainly be logical that the
Court's caveat in D'Amario could only have been properly read or restrictively
applied to a plaintiff s comparative negligence. It could also include, arguendo, the
third party tortfeasor who caused the so-called first accident. If footnote two in
D'Amario had been read as restrictively so as not to allow the first party tortfeasor
to be either part of the suit as a cross-claimant, initially sued by the plaintiff, or
even a Fabre defendant, then all persons would not be equal before the law in
violation of Section II of the Florida Constitution.2 55 If the plaintiffs own fault
could be used to apportion fault in a crashworthiness case, then why not a third
party tortfeasor? In comparative negligence analysis it does not seem to make a
difference whether the comparative fault was on the part of the driver, who
happened to be a plaintiff, or an adverse third party tortfeasor driver who was a codefendant.2 56 Both create the first collision leading to the referenced
crashworthiness second collision and putative enhanced injuries.
However, all this esoteric conjecture was clearly put to rest by the Florida
Legislature in 2010. As a result of heavy lobbying on both sides of the issue, 25 7
including adverse public policy implications cause by D'Amario, the Legislature
again amended Florida Statute Section 768.81(3).258 This time it reconfirmed that
Florida is a pure pro rata comparative fault state.259 More importantly, their
expressed legislative intent-so there would no misunderstanding or uncertainly as
in 2006-specifically stated one purpose of the revisions was the overruling of
D'Amario.2 60 The statute now expressly applied to crashworthiness cases by name
and reaffirmed Fabre,which required all those responsible for a crash be put on the
verdict form. 261
In no unmistakable terms the Legislature's revisions to 768.81(3) in 2010,
262
becoming effective in 2011, abolished, overruled, and struck down D'Amario.
That statute reads in pertinent part:
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
768.81

Comparative fault.

FLA. STAT. §768.81(3) (2006); D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 426 n.2 (Fla. 2001).
253.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 426 n.2.
254.
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
255.
See Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1061 n.10 (Fla. 2007) (Florida has adopted pure comparative
256.
negligence).
Wells, supranote 1, at 14.
257.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2010).
258.
Id.
259.
FLA. STAT. §768.81 (2006).
260.
Wells, supranote 1, at 16.
261.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2010).
262.
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(1) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Accident" means the events and actions that relate to the
incident as well as those events and actions that relate to the
alleged defect or injuries, including enhanced injuries.

(c) "Negligence action" means, without limitation, a civil action
for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability,
products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in
terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories.
The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party,
determines whether an action is a negligence action.
(d) "Products liability action" means a civil action based upon a
theory of strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, nuisance,
or similar theories for damages caused by the manufacture,
construction, design, formulation, installation, preparation, or
assembly of a product. The term includes an action alleging that
injuries received by a claimant in an accident were greater than the
injuries the claimant would have received but for a defective
product. The substance of an action, not the conclusory terms used
by a party, determines whether an action is a products liability
action.

(3) Apportionment of damages. In a negligence action, the court
shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such
party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of doctrine of joint
and several liability.

(b) In a products liability action alleging that injuries received by a
claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product, the
trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed
to the accident when apportioning the fault between or among
them. The jury shall be appropriately instructed by the trial judge
on the apportionment of fault in products liability actions where
there are allegations that the injuries received by the claimant in an
accident were enhanced by a defective product. The rules of
evidence apply to these actions.
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Section 2. The Legislature intends that this act be applied
retroactively and overrule D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.
2d 424 (Fla. 2001), which adopted what the Florida Supreme Court
acknowledged to be a minority view. That minority view fails to
apportion fault for damages consistent with Florida's statutory
comparative fault system, codified in s. 768.81, Florida Statutes,
and leads to inequitable and unfair results, regardless of the
damages sought in the litigation. The Legislature finds that, in a
products liability action as defined in this act, fault should be
apportioned among all responsible persons.
Section 3. This act is remedial in nature and applies retroactively.
The Legislature finds that the retroactive application of this act
does not unconstitutionally impair vested rights. Rather, the law
affects only remedies, permitting recovery against all tortfeasors
while lessening the ultimate liability of each consistent with this
state's statutory comparative fault system, codified in 768.81,
Florida Statutes. In all cases, the Legislature intends that this act be
construed consistent with the due process provisions of the State
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.263
The law was made retroactive.2 64 Ultimately, this legislation is assuredly
headed to the Florida Supreme Court. Four out of five Circuit Court judges have
upheld its validity as to the retroactivity of the statute.2 65 However, these 2011
revisions to 768.81(3), even by putting a legislative dagger in D'Amario's heart,
did not do away with the crashworthiness enhanced injury concept-only how
procedurally these types of cases would be tried.
The Florida Legislature put Florida back in line with a majority of other
jurisdictions across the country in terms of apportionment of fault in
crashworthiness cases.266 Other state courts, consistent with the 2011 revisions of
267
768.81(3), had already found D'Amario unpersuasive. For example, a Hawaiian
court in Dannenfelzer v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.268 held as follows:
Thus, in keeping with the precedent of the Hawaii Supreme Court,
the California Supreme Court, and the majority of other
jurisdictions, the Court finds that Defendant may indeed assert a
Id. (emphasis added)
263.
264.
Id.
See Corbett v. Arctic CAT, Inc., No. I1-40-CA (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 2011); Travis v. Am. Honda
265.
Motor Co., Inc., No. 002935 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2011); Baker v. Ford, No. 2010 CA 003434 C (Fla. Isr Cir.
Ct., August 13, 2012); Brannen v. Ford, No. 16-201 1-CA-1772-XXXX (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct., March 14, 2013). Contra
Johnson v. Ford, No. 16-2007-CA-0409-XXXX (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct., September 15, 2012).
266.
Wells, supranote 1, at 16-17.
267.
Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., 228 P.3d 737 (Utah 2010); Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550
(Iowa 2009); Dannenfelser v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Haw. 2005).
268.
Dannenfelser, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091.
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defense of comparative negligence to Plaintiffs negligence and
strict liability claims regarding the injuries stemming from the
"second collision." Having reached that conclusion, however, the
Court notes that the Rules of Evidence still apply, and any
evidence of negligence on the part of Plaintiff that is wholly
irrelevant to the issue of the allegedly enhanced injuries would be
properly excluded.
Determining which evidence of negligence is relevant to the
causation of the enhanced injuries is a highly fact-specific inquiry,
however. Indeed, this is precisely the difficulty that makes
holdings such as D'Amario, which seek to broadly exclude
evidence of comparative fault regarding the underlying collision
from the lawsuit regarding the allegedly enhanced injuries, so

problematic. 2 69
8. Confusion in Burden of Proof in Crashworthiness Cases: Reason to
Abolish Enhanced Injury Theory
A debate has raged across the country for over thirty years, leading to a split of
authority over what the burden of proof level is to establish an enhanced injury in a
crashworthiness case. 2 70 A brief review of this evidentiary debate is necessary in
further arguing for the abolishment of crashworthiness. The opposing camps break
down between those referred to as the Huddell-Caizzo or Fox-Mitchell
advocates.27 1
Huddell v. Levin first established criteria for specifying the burden of proof in
enhanced injury cases. 2 72 That court, in a diversity case, was applying New Jersey
law.273 Huddell stated enhanced injury cases "require a highly refined and almost
invariably difficult presentation of proof."2 7 4 Yet, the decision did not set forth how
specific elements of proof were to be proven.27 5
Essentially, Huddell said it was a plaintiffs burden to demonstrate a practical
alternative safer design, which if it had been used would not have prevented the
enhanced injury, and then some probable methodology was required for the
connecting of the enhanced injury to the alleged defect.276 A submitted underlying
rationale for Huddell was that a crashworthy defendant and the first collision
tortfeasor were not considered joint or concurring tortfeasors for liability
purposes.277 This conclusion was different from the D'Amario holding. Thus, a
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id at 1096-97
See Chadwick, supranote 57, at 1238-57; Vickles & Oldham, supra note 34, at 426-35, 440-44.
Vickles & Oldham, supranote 34, at 440-43.
537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 737-38.
See Hoenig, supranote 218, at 699-706.
Huddell,537 F.2d at 738.
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plaintiff had the burden to apportionout what was the enhanced or second collision
injury from that which would have been caused by the first collision anyway.278 If a
plaintiff was not able to achieve this burden, the manufacturer defendant would
prevail.
A concurring opinion in Huddell suggested that the majority had imposed too
onerous a burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish the enhanced injury. 279 The
dissent asserted that the person causing the initial accident (first collision), and the
motor vehicle manufacturer allegedly causing the enhanced injury (second
collision), should be treated as "concurrent tortfeasors." 28 0 Thus, under the
concurrence, a plaintiff would need only to prove a causal link to the injury from
the alleged defect. 28' Thereafter, the burden (of persuasion) of proving up the
enhanced injury separated from whatever the injury was or would have been from
the first accident and then transferred to the crashworthiness defendant since this
proof was no different from that faced by concurring tortfeasors under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 533B(2) (1965).282 If the manufacturer, as
the second collision defendant, could not separate out the concurring or enhanced
injury from the first and second collision in a crashworthiness case, that
manufacturing defendant would then be saddled with all the damages flowing from
the injury.
Following Huddell, a later Second Circuit decision, Caizzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A. G.,283 which analyzed New York law, held that a plaintiff "should be required to
prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design." 2 84
The plaintiff would be required to prove the actual nature and extent of the injuries
which were enhanced by the alleged defective crashworthiness design. 2 85 The
plaintiff under this decision would have the burden to prove how the alleged
crashworthiness defect created the enhanced or greater injury from the one that
caused the first accident.286
The Huddell-Caizzo approach, in regards to how one goes about proving up an
enhanced injury, is now presently recognized as a minority position.287 There have
been numerous law review articles over the years identifying those jurisdictions

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 739.
Id. at 744 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
Id
Id. at 738.
Id. at 745. Florida's Standard Jury Instructions on concurrent tortfeasor states as follows:
In order to be regarded as a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage], negligence need not
be the only cause. Negligence may be a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] even
though it operates in combination with [the act of another] [some natural cause] [or] some
other cause if such other cause occurs at the same time as the negligence and if the
negligence contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage].

283.
284.
285.
286.

§5.1(b) Legal Cause (proximate, concurring, intervening cause).
647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.

287.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

FLA. STD. JURY INST.
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that have followed Huddell-Caizzo. 288 In adopting Florida's version of
crashworthiness law in terms of liability for fault in 2001, D'Amario followed the
minority views of states like South Carolina, Arizona, and Iowa. 2 89 Both South
Carolina and Iowa have been identified as jurisdictions in the Huddell-Caizzo camp
on the burden of proof issue which represents, in turn, the minority position on this
issue.290
The Fox-Mitchell line of cases took their origin and theoretical underpinnings
from the concurring opinion in Huddell. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., decided under
Wyoming law, which studied the issue of enhanced injury and articulated a
different, but lesser standard of proof than Huddell required. 2 9 1 The Fox decision
applied to principles of joint and several liability to determine causation in
crashworthiness cases, in essence treating the first collision and second collision
defendants as concurrent tortfeasors.292 The court in Fox analogized its rationale of
concurrent tortfeasors with the situation of an active and passive tortfeasor
recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 433.293 Analytically, a
plaintiffs burden of evidentiary proof of the enhanced injury under Fox was to
prove that the alleged defect contributed to the total injuries.294 The burden then
shifted to the manufacturer/defendant to apportion out those injuries between the
first and second collision. 29 However, if the manufacturer could not then separate
out the injuries, they became responsible for all damages. Fox also recognized that
even in crashworthiness cases there may still be injuries which were indivisible,
and could not be separated out, such as death.296 Therefore, the manufacturer would
be liable for the full damages of those categories of injuries that could not be
apportioned.297
Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. followed Fox applying Minnesota law and
holding that a plaintiff need only establish that the design defect was a "substantial
factor" in causing the injury.298 The burden of persuasion would then shift to the
manufacturer who became responsible for separating out the initial injuries from
the enhanced injuries, if possible. 299 Initially, the Fox-Mitchell evidentiary
establishment was not followed by many jurisdictions. 3 00 Now, however, it is
considered to be the majority position 301
The Florida Supreme Court recognized and adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts on Products Liability, Section 402A, for strict liability in West v.
288.
289.

Vickles & Oldham, supra note 34, at 429 n.74; Shad, supra note 28, at 1335 & 1336 n.57.
D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d at 433-34 (Fla. 2001).

290.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (1998).

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id at 788.
Id at 787-788.
Id. at 788.
Id
Id
See generally Fox, 575 F.2d at 788.
669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1203-05.
Vickles & Oldham, supra note 34, at 433 n.99; Shad, supra note 28, at 1338.

301.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,§ 16 (1998).
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CaterpillarTractor Co. 3 02 The Second Restatement did not, however, address the
burden of proof for enhancement of injuries in crashworthiness cases. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts, established by the American Law Institute (ALI),
attempted to set forth a standard for the burden of proof in enhanced injury
crashworthiness cases.303 In an analysis leading up to the Third Restatement
expression of the burden of proof the reporter reviewed both the majority and
minority approaches to proving up enhanced injuries.3 04 The Third Restatement
ultimately adopted the evidentiary rationale followed by Fox-Mitchell as it was
believed to be the majority position of the country's jurisdictions. 305
The ALI treated the issue of enhancement of injury in crashworthiness cases as
an adjunct of the joint tortfeasor law and then framed the issue as one of "increased
harm."3 06 This rule followed the Second Restatement section 432B(2), first cited in
the concurring opinion in Huddell, which addressed apportionment of fault or
liability between multiple tortfeasors when causing the same harm.307 The Third
Restatement stated, adopting Fox-Mitchell, a plaintiff only had to demonstrate the
alleged crashworthiness defect was a substantialfactor in causing the "increased
harm."308 If that increased harm could not then be separated from other causes of
the injury, (i.e., a tortfeasor driver), the manufacturer would become jointly and
severally liable for all of the harm, injuries or damages established. And, as a deep
pocket, the author would note, it would be the entity most likely to pick up the
entire damages tab.
No Florida appellate court cases have been found where either Huddell-Caizzo
or Fox-Mitchell was cited for the burden of proof in a crashworthiness case,
including D'Amario.3 09 Nevertheless, the Reporter for the Third Restatement
forecasted that Florida, once it decided, would be projected as one of "those states
whose law either supports, or is strongly leaning toward the majority view [FoxMitchell]."3io In 1998 when the Third Restatement was first published, D'Amario
had not yet been decided. 31 To support its position here the Third Restatement
relied on a pre-D'Amario federal diversity decision for how Florida might
ultimately decide the issue of burden of proof in crashworthiness cases. The case
was McLeod v. American Motors Corp.312
McLeod involved a case where there was an allegation that "the front seat track
assembly caused [the plaintiff] to sustain serious injuries in an auto accident." 3 13
The crash occurred when a woman driving an American Motors Corporation
302.

336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976).

303.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,§ 16 (1998).

304.
305.
306.
307.

Roth, The Burden of Proof Conundrum, supra note 1, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 243.

308.

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,§ 16 (1998).

309.

See generally D Amario, 806 So. 2d 424.

310.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,§ 16 (1998); see also Vickles & Oldham,

supra note
311.
312.
313.

34, at 433 n.99.
See generally D Amario, 806 So. 2d 424.
723 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 832.
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(AMC) Pacer attempted to avoid a drunk driver by swerving and slamming on her
brakes, but there was still a head-on collision.3 14 Her 120 pound Great Dane was in
the rear seat of the AMC Pacer.315 A defective bolt on the front seat was alleged to
have broken before the impact due to the sudden braking and the dog hitting the
rear of the front seat.316 In conjunction with the Great Dane being thrown forward
and the driver braking, the plaintiff was propelled into the steering wheel and front
windshield.3 17 McLeod, in deciding the case on its facts, found no Florida precedent
for dealing with apportionment of injuries in a crashworthiness case. 3 18 The federal
court, projecting what a Florida state court might do, affirmed a verdict for the
plaintiff based on the correctness of a concurring cause jury instruction. 3 19 AMC's
defense was that the drunk driver and plaintiff were the 100% cause of all the
injuries.320
McLeod viewed injury enhancement as a concurrent cause tort.3 2 1 Thus, the
plaintiff under McLeod only had to demonstrate that the alleged defect
"substantially contributed" to producing her injuries, whatever they were. 32 2 The
burden of persuasion then shifted to the defendant, AMC, to apportion or separate
out the enhanced injuries from the non-enhanced injuries.323 In McLeod, AMC was
not able to do that, or prove that injuries from the first or second collision were
divisible between the two concurring tortfeasors. 32 4 Once decided in D'Amario, the
Florida Supreme Court held that a crashworthiness defendant, to the contrary, was
not a concurring tortfeasor with the initial tortfeasor at fault for the first collision.325
D'Amario stated:
However, it is not entirely clear that our holding in Fabre resolves
the question presented today since Fabre involved a simple
automobile accident involving joint and concurrent tortfeasors,
and did not involve successive tortfeasors or enhanced or
secondary injuries allegedly stemming from a manufacturing or
design defect. 326
However, McLeod also recognized that Florida had a successive tortfeasor rule,
as D'Amario ultimately analyzed a crashworthiness claim to be.3 2 7 The McLeod
court stated that "Florida law apparently holds that in successive injury cases the
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id.
Id.
Id.
McLeod, 723 F.2d at 832.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
McLeod, 723 F.2d at 834.
Id at 833-34.
Id. at 835.
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 441.
Id. at 435 (emphasis in original and added).
McLeod, 723 F.2d at 834.
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jury should be allowed to apportion damages between the defendants; however, if
damages are not reasonably apportionable, plaintiff may recover the full amount
from either of the two defendants." 32 8 McLeod cited Washewich v. LaFave,3 29
which was a successive tortfeasor case not cited in D'Amario, although the Florida
Supreme Court in the later case analogized crashworthiness liability to a successive
tortfeasor occurrence.3333 In Washewich, a plaintiff was thrown from a vehicle as a
result of an automobile collision and then separately run over by the defendant. 33 1
The court held:
[W]here the evidence reveals two successive accidents, and the
defendant is only responsible for the second accident, the burden is
on the plaintiff to prove to the extent reasonably possible what
injuries were proximately caused by each of the two accidents....
[B]ut if an apportionment is impossible, the jury may be
authorized to charge the defendant with all damages flowing from
the entire injury.332
McLeod also relied on an old Florida Fifth Circuit case, Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt
Motors, Inc.333 Smith reversed a summary judgment for a defendant even though
the plaintiff was not able to apportion injuries between the initial rear-end collision
and those which may have been caused by an alleged defect that allowed the
seatback to recline or collapse rearward during the impact.334 The Smith decision
turned on a concurring cause instruction given from Florida's Standard Jury
Instruction that "where an injury is indivisible and apportionment is impossible,
[the] plaintiff may recover his entire damages from either tortfeasor." 335 In other
words, a crashworthiness defendant was a concurring tortfeasor who acts as a
causative factor with the fault of the first tortfeasor initiating the accident. Not
reaching this precise evidentiary issue, referring to McLeod, the Northern District
of Florida in Humphreys v. GeneralMotors Corp.33 6 observed:
At this point, the Court makes no determination as to whether
Plaintiffs' bear the burden of proving the exact amount which Mrs.
Humphreys' injuries were "enhanced" by the alleged defect. The
parties dispute vigorously whether this is an "enhancement of
injuries" case where the reasoning of [Huddell] should apply. At
this point, the Court is inclined to agree with Plaintiffs that under
[McLeod] Plaintiffs are not obligated to follow Huddell's
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
248 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1971).
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 435.
Washewich, 248 So. 2d at 671.
Id. at 672 73.
556 F.2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 1977).
Id. at 729.
Id.
839 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
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requirement that they prove, essentially through expert testimony,
the precise extent to which the alleged defect enhanced the injuries
caused by the collision. . . . Under these circumstances, whether

Plaintiffs bear the extra burden under Huddell is moot. 33 7
The Third Restatement was apparently correct in projecting where Florida law
was as of the time of its 1998 publication-that a crashworthiness defendant was a
concurrent tortfeasor with the party causing the initial accident. What they could
not foresee was the Florida Supreme Court, three years later, analyzing
crashworthiness cases not in terms of joint and several liability or concurring
tortfeasors--quite to the contrary to what became the Third Restatement position
reaching a different result. 33 8 That is to say, in D'Amario they were instead
successive tortfeasors.
9. Irreconcilable Evidentiary Problems For Indivisible Injuries Now
Exist in Crashworthiness Cases Since 2011
In D'Amario, for crashworthiness cases, the Court flippantly dealt with the
issue of an indivisible injury.33 9 For example, at footnote 16 the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
We recognize that in some cases the jury may not be able to
separate the damages from the initial and secondary collisions.
Should such an event occur, the parties should resort to established
precedent in that area of the law. 3 40
The Arizona Supreme Court in Larsen v. Nissan Motor Co., elaborated on this
concept by stating:
Thus in an indivisible injury case, the factfinder is to compute the
total amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff and the
percentage of fault of each tortfeasor. Multiplying the first figure
by the second gives the maximum recoverable against each
tortfeasor. This result conforms not only with the intent of the
legislature and the text of the statute but also with common sense.
When damages cannot be apportioned between multiple
tortfeasors, there is no reason why those whose conduct produced
successive but indivisible injuries should be treated differently
from those whose independent conduct caused injury in a single
accident.

. .

. Thus, as in cases like this and Zuern, where "there

has been a chain of cause and effect that produces injury in a single
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.at 828 n.7 (citations omitted).
See D'Amario, 806 So.2d 424.
Id.
Id. at 440 n.16.
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accident," our supreme court has now adopted a rule for indivisible
injury cases under which damage awards are based on allocation of
percentages of fault.34 '
To support its position on indivisible injuries in crashworthiness cases, the
Florida Supreme Court cited Gross v. Lyons in its D'Amario holding.342 This
reliance on Gross, however, causes a number of problems. First, the central issue in
Gross was whether to extend the rule of successive tortfeasor non-apportionment
of damages to a "prior tortfeasor" 343 not to a successive tortfeasor as D'Amario had
analogized was a second collision enhanced injury.3 " The Gross court did,
however, review the indivisible injury rule and why a subsequent tortfeasor was
responsible for the entire set of damages if a jury could not apportion between one
event, and a later occurring second event. This doctrine was originally enunciated
in C F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, which held that a subsequent tortfeasor was
responsible for everything if the jury was unable to apportion the damages.345
Gross also cited with approval the Fourth District's decision in Washewich v.
LaFave, already discussed.346
D'Amario, in this reference to Gross, incorrectly applied the successive
tortfeasor rule of indivisible injury to the circumstances of a crashworthiness case
by its footnote directive.347 For example, Gross stated as follows:
The rule of Hamblen v. Owens has as its purpose the prevention of
a subsequent wrongdoer from escaping responsibility where his
conduct contributed to the creation of the situation in which the
problems of apportionment arose. 34 8
This referral to Hamblen by Gross, the latter case cited as controlling by
D'Amario in certain situations,349 was specifically contrary to the underlying
rationale of the crashworthiness doctrine. 350 This was because crashworthiness
tortfeasors had nothing to do with causing or creating the first collision or accident,
the so-called non-enhanced injury.3 ' Gross was the exact flip side of the coin.
They were not going to let off the hook a subsequent tortfeasor's responsibility visA-vis the first or prior tortfeasor. Therefore, the rationale behind Gross and the
indivisible injury rule was specifically contrary to the underlying rationale of

341.
1998)).
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 123 (citing Piner v. Superior Court In & For County of Maricopa, 962 P.2d 909, 916 (Ariz.
Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 279.
See generally D'Amario, 806 So. 2d 424.
172 So. 694 (Fla. 1937).
248 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1971).
D'Amario, 806 So. 2d at 442. n.20.
Gross, 763 So. 2d at 278 (quoting Washewich, 248 So. 2d at 673).
See D'Amario, 806 So. 2d 424.
Id.
Id.
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D'Amario and the first accident tortfeasor not being a part of a crashworthiness

case.352
There is another compelling reason a crashworthiness reference to Gross was
misplaced. One sub-heading from the D'Amario opinion stated: "No Liability for
Initial Accident."3 3 The court thus held, as a matter of law, that "successive
tortfeasors [could] only be held liable [in crashworthiness cases] for the damages
they cause, and not be held liable for the damages caused by the initial tortfeasor.
We agree with this . . ..
The indivisible injury rule, supposedly set out in Gross
v. Lyons, however, was patently inconsistent with the statement of separation of
liability between a first collision and a second collision event. 355 This Gross
rationale, if applicable, compelled a result where a first collision tortfeasor could
not be connected to an injury-enhancing second collision case to reduce fault. Yet,
at the same time the second collision (crashworthiness) defendant could be held
liable for even non-enhanced injuries which were not apportionable and were
caused by the first tortfeasor. This constituted a fatal flaw and irreconcilable
difference between Gross v. Lyons and crashworthiness cases.
Gross also cited section 433A of the Second Restatement which allowed for
non-apportionment of damages attributed to one defendant where two or more
316
defendants combine to produce a single harm, i.e., concurrent tortfeasors.
Contrary to the Gross citation, an injury-enhancing harm in a crashworthiness case
was not a single harm at all. Courts specifically separated out the first collision
from the second collision-there were no single confluences of accidents to result
in a single harm. 357 D'Amario's own language seemed to compel a contrary
conclusion from that of Gross regarding whether a crashworthiness enhanced
injury could even be indivisible in the first place.358 This could be seen from the
D'Amario's statement that crashworthiness liability "is predicated upon the
existence of a distinct and second injury caused by a defective product, and
assumes the plaintiff to be in the condition to which he is rendered after the first
accident."359
A more incompatible point of application to the indivisible rule in
crashworthiness cases by D'Amario at footnote 16 needs to be illustrated. Despite
this apparent inconsistency in citing Gross, even if damages could not be
apportioned, how could Gross apply since by the point of verdict only the car
manufacturer is the defendant? Under D'Amario there could be no Fabre
360
defendants such as the initial tortfeasor.
So who was to even consider
apportionment between either concurrent, successive or subsequent tortfeasors, at
least under the D'Amario rule? As stated above, the manufacturer had to absorb
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
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liability for the first collision which on the other hand D'Amario held expressly the
manufacturer could not be liable for.
Gross v. Lyons stated that to impose total liability on a single defendant for a
single harm when unable to apportion damages was not inconsistent with then
section 768.81(3) of the Florida Statutes, or with Fabrev. Marin, on apportionment
of fault.3 61 Gross then went on to state that the indivisible injury rule and the
apportionment of damages based on fault are not mutually exclusive to one
another.362 Before the 2011 Amendment overruling D'Amario, that court
specifically rejected the application of Fabre's apportionment of fault in second
collision and enhanced injury crashworthiness case. 3 63 D'Amario held that being
able to apportion fault between injury causing tortfeasors were two mutually
exclusive concepts.364 Thus, the holding in Gross v. Lyons also seems to be in
jeopardy since section 768.81(3), and D'Amario's otherwise inconsistent reference
to Gross, for other reasons, should not survive the new law on these points either.
The Third Restatement recognized the indivisible injury rule and the difficulty
in apportioning damages between first and second collisions.3 65 That was a basis
for the drafters' adoption of the Fox-Mitchell approach.366 Of course, the Third
Restatement had already adopted the majority position on comparative fault
principles, which D'Amario rejected, being applicable for apportioning fault in
crashworthiness cases.367 Thus, in a crashworthiness case, for the indivisible injury
rule to apply, apportionment of fault must be permitted under section 768.81(3)
(2011) and Fabre.The problem was: how is this to be done?
10. The Crashworthiness Enhanced Injury Doctrine-Abolish it in
Florida
With the passage of 768.81(3) in 2011 specifically overruling D'Amario on the
issue of including, under Fabre, for example, a drunk driver, could be put on the
verdict form to apportion fault.368 Yet, the state of crashworthiness law in Florida
remains a ball of confusion. Perhaps better said, it remains a conundrum wrapped
up in an enigma.
After more than four decades, the crashworthiness doctrine, which includes
proving an enhanced or increased injury over and above what would have been
suffered by a motor vehicle occupant but for the defect, has outlived its necessity.
It is an arbitrary and capricious evidentiary theorem and legal fiction, subjectively
espoused by injury mechanism experts for both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys,
the latter representing motor vehicle manufacturers.
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For the state of Florida, considering the advent of the 2011 legislation of
768.81(3) which, legislatively overruled D'Amario v. Ford, an alternative legal
standard for these motor vehicle crashworthiness cases needs to be established,
irrespective of what the Florida Supreme Court may do if the revised 768.81(3)
comes before it on any aspect of the litigation, i.e., retroactivity. Judicial changes
are possible since crashworthiness is a judicially created concept.
Pure apportionment of fault as espoused in 768.81(3) (2011) is the public
policy of Florida. If a drunk driver, likely without insurance, slams into the rear of
a motor vehicle and occupants' front seats deform rearward as the claimed
crashworthiness defect, whoever is responsible for the share of the injuries will be
apportioned by percentage. Public policy of who has insurance, deep pockets, or
who can pay is an antithesis to our structured society, at least in theory.
Apportionment of fault is not a bad concept. Everyone takes responsibility for
his or her own conduct. If that conduct causes motor vehicle crash injuries, then
that person must step up and own that liability. Really nothing has changed from
the D'Amario rule. Under that case decision juries still had to apportion fault-who
caused the enhanced, or as the Third Restatement called it, "increased harm."36 9
The only difference was that the tortfeasor, drunk or otherwise, was not on a
verdict form under Fabre v. Marin, or then 768.81(3) (2006), so that a line
percentage of fault to that person could be filled in. 37 0 Yet the jury, probably
somewhat unfairly to defendant manufacturers, had to say whether or not the
injuries and damages were from that first collision, i.e., severity of crash, or from
the alleged second collision defect in the motor vehicle which caused the enhanced
injury, i.e., broken seatback, seatbelt issue, or post crash fuel fed fire.
In 1968 when the enhanced injury legal fiction of a duty for manufacturers to
make their vehicles reasonably safe from the so-called second collision between
the occupants and the interior of the vehicle, there was a need for this made up
legal precept. But, thousands of lawsuits later with motor vehicle manufacturers
competing in the marketing field using "safety" as a hook, a much more regulated
industry by NHTSA, regulations upgrading safety features in motor vehicles that
are mandatory have, in this author's view, made the enhanced injury
crashworthiness doctrine legal theorem last breath to become obsolete. In essence,
time for the junk heap of crashed motor vehicles.
The whole concept of crashworthiness first espoused in Larsen was based on
an amateurish understanding of motor vehicles. A crashworthiness claim does not
always deal with the occupant hitting some interior of the vehicle, like Dr. Huddell
contacting the unfriendly head restraint. In a post-crash fire case like D'Amario, the
plaintiff never hits anything in the vehicle itself that caused the operative enhanced
injury. 37 1 But when injuries in crashes do occur, as noted earlier, they happen faster
than the eye can blink.372
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So how is the proverbial jury of one's own peers able to figure out this
complex web of physics, biomedical engineering, engineering, and things such as a
plaintiffs attorneys' presentation of fault tree analysis or a failure mode analysis?
Not always accurately for sure. An argument that the traditional common law jury
system may not be suited for such matters will have to await some other day for
discussion.
But in Florida, a jury still has to apportion between injuries caused by the first
collision and those that were enhanced or incurred by the so-called crashworthiness
or second collision defect. Yet, since 1976 when the Florida Supreme Court ruled
in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho,3 7 3 some 36 years later the Florida Supreme Court
still has yet to initiate jury instructions in crashworthiness cases to aid jurors in
trying to cope with these concepts, and to overcome glazed over eyes of being lost,
or worst yet, asleep after the afternoon lunch break.
As a follow-up, even after public input and after literally years of working on
them, the Florida Supreme Court's Bar Committee on Standard Jury Instructions
has yet to provide the Court with acceptable crashworthiness jury instructions. So
for all these years the trial courts, particularly after D'Amario, were left to their
own devices to determine what, if any, non-standard instructions for
crashworthiness cases might be given. The latest Florida Supreme Court's
abandonment of its duty on standard jury instructions occurred on May 17, 2012,
when the Court adopted "tentatively" new instructions for strict liability and
negligence separate failure to warn instructions.3 74 Yet, the Court again abrogated
its guidance to adopt an instruction on crashworthiness and simply rejected the
proposed instruction 403.16 brought forth by the Committee. In February of 2013,
the Committee proposed the following instruction on crashworthiness: "[Claimant
also] claims the [he] [she] sustained greater injuries that what [he] [she] would
have sustained in the (describe the accident) if the (describe the product) had not
been defective." 375 Yet, Florida juries and attorneys currently remain without any
guidance from the Florida Supreme Court on what a jury might find in order to
impose crashworthiness liability upon a defendant.
Consequently, Florida Statute 768.81(3) (2011), created pure apportionment of
fault, per Fabre v. Marin, and specifically overruled D'Amario v. Ford,was not all
that legally revolutionary-was more of a political choice of whose ox was being
gored the most between the plaintiffs' and defense bars!
So now that one has been brought to this conclusion, this article offers to
replace the crashworthiness enhanced or increased injury rule in Florida with a new
concept.
All potential parties involved who may have contributed to the crash and
injuries-whomever they may be-if appropriate evidence is proffered, must be
plead on the verdict form. The approach then is who is liable for the injuries and
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damages? There is nothing enhanced about it. The injuries are the injuries, with the
residual economic and non-economic damages which flow from them. The jury
will have to decide who, among the culprits, are liable, or all of them, and to what
extent. That is the way it has always been. And if they cannot make up their minds,
then a mistrial must be declared. It cannot be like D'Amario's reference to Gross v.
Lyons in this situation which said, as earlier noted, if injuries could not be
segregated then either party could be responsible for all of them. 37 6 But this can be
no more since that rationale is a joint and several liability concept, which in all its
parts and iterations has been abolished in Florida.
Judicial direction and guideposts to juries on how to decide each party's
apportionment of fault are needed now. Even if indivisible injuries like death are
involved, the apportionment decision can be applicable even though death is death
and partial death or a percentage of death is not possible. But the jury is
determining liability percentages, which then translates to how much of the
damages, if any, arising from that death are attributed to each party. They are not
dicing up the cadaver as a medical examiner.
The Florida Supreme Court needs to do two things. First, they should abolish
the crashworthiness enhanced injury doctrine altogether. Second, they should
promulgate some instructional guidelines to judges and juries in motor vehicle
products liability cases where the alleged defect did not cause the initial crash,
whatever it may be, but is alleged to have caused the injury.
But what, or better yet, how do you replace the crashworthiness, enhanced
injury doctrine? And a more difficult question is what do you replace it with? The
author's proposal is not bulletproof or crash-proof to be more apropos. It does
seem, however, to provide a viable alternative to an otherwise mixed up legal
theory. On one hand, as things now stand, if a plaintiff can't prove the enhanced
injury and separate the first from the second, then he or she loses. On the other
hand, elsewhere, if the enhanced injury can't be separated from the initial injury,
the manufacturer buys the entire farm. What then is the burden of proof? Is it a
"substantial factor analysis" or a "more likely than not"?
For Florida, this proposal would be made simple. A plaintiff could still allege
that a defect in a motor vehicle did not prevent injuries to a plaintiff, but not a
defect which caused the accident. There would be only one injury-the final one,
whatever it might be. Then the parties would use Florida's Standard Jury
Instructions, of the greater weight of the evidence, to determine causation. In these
cases, concurrent or intervening cause instructions should not be given. Only the
legal cause 5.1(a) instruction should be given. This should give the jury what it
needs, like in any other case, a standard to determine fault of the first tortfeasor,
Fabre or not, or the manufacturer.
However, there must be some criteria for a jury to determine whether an
alleged defect exists which played an apportionable role in legally causing the
ultimate injury. With such criterion the jury would be better able to apportion fault
by percentage. Florida's present definition of a defect as being unreasonably
376.
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dangerous either under a consumer expectation and/or risk liability, if one above
the other adopted, is unfair to the other party. Thus, a new defect definition is
offered, with some criteria to determine the question proposed.
A "defect" would be where the design or manufacture of the item (e.g.,
component, part) created an unreasonably dangerous environment to the occupant's
protection once the motor vehicle was involved in an accident, crash or impact. In
determining if that defect criterion has been met, the following elements should be
considered, not necessarily in this order:
1. Was the speed of the first crash a causative factor in creating the
injury, and if so, does that fault goes to the first tortfeasor?
2. Did the safety device at issue, e.g., driver's side airbag, operate and
perform as the manufacturer intended it to based upon their
development and testing?
3. Was the manufacturer's safety device comparable to what other motor
vehicle manufacturers were using at the time, or were other safety
devices more sophisticated or better than the defendant was using, at
least when the vehicle was first designed and developed?
4. Was the severity of the crash between the vehicle to vehicle, vehicle to
object, or single vehicle crash so violent and severe that it
overwhelmed the ability of the manufacture's safety devices to offer
reasonable protection?
5. Is there crash data available to help understand whether the type of
crash involved creates the type of injury, or death, that occurred in the
subject crash?
6. Have there been the same and nearly identical crashes which have
occurred to other years of the model run vehicle in question with
similar results, and if so did the manufacturer adequately review those
crashes to ensure their design was operating as intended?
7. Did the vehicle comply with any applicable Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards?
8. Did other manufacturers' similar types of vehicles have crashes with
similar injury results so they jury can compare if the subject
defendant's vehicle was an outlier?
9. Prior similar incidences involving same design and/or model at issue in
subject case.
10. Did the plaintiff present an alternative economically feasible design
available to the manufacturer which, if used, would not have made the
injuries as they were, or protected against them?
All of these guidelines are subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and
reliant on the dynamics of the trial and the evidentiary record, to be appropriate to
be given. And they are not exhaustive. These instructions would help the jury
weigh the comparative fault of the parties when a manufacturer is included in what
formerly would be a pure plaintiff crashworthiness case.
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These simple criteria should take the place of the present jury instructions of
defective and unreasonably dangerous under either or both the consumer
expectation test or risk utility analysis.m Force v. FordMotor Co. held that with
seatbelts there was knowledge or expectation by the consumer.m But no average
consumers, or very few, have any idea of how a seatbelt really locks up, or how
pretensioners or web clamps work, for example. Or, for that matter any expectation
of how people get injured in motor vehicle crashes. So both these criteria for what
is unreasonably dangerous should be discarded for pure common sense elements.
CONCLUSION

The focus of the Florida Supreme Court should not now be whether the
Legislature overstepped its boundaries with the passage of 768.81(3) (2011)
overruling D'Amario with respect to apportionment of fault, but to intellectually
deal with the totality of the crashworthiness enhanced injury worn out doctrine that
has handcuffed the proper decision-making in crashworthiness cases by abolishing
the doctrine itself, and setting the path of the law in Florida on a bolder, more
realistic path of responsibility.
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